

Chapter Two

PREHISTORY AND "PARADISE LOST"

1. *The Idea of Philosophical World History*

The introduction to philosophy contained in this book is organized according to the general order followed in world history. We shall retrace and reconstruct the career of humanity from prehistory to the present time. The over-arching structure of the text will thus be provided by *philosophical world-history*. Generally, this is a specialization in history writing that professional historians ignore—unless perhaps they are writing elementary textbooks for the schools. It is not considered a subject for research. Mastery of original sources is an impossible task for any one world historian. Professional historians are usually each specialized in minute corner of history. But some philosophers have attempted to understand the meaning of all world history as a whole. No astronomer knows all the stars, and no philosophical world historian knows all the nations of the world by first-hand documents. Still, it is possible to formulate a hypothesis of about the meaning of history and then scientifically seek to identify a single nation that refutes it. The justification for doing philosophical world history is that if philosophers do not do it in a rational manner, myth-makers and ideologues will continue to market images of world history free of rational control.

Universal (or world) history aspires to comprehend the totality of past human experience and implicitly to discern in it some message of present and future utility. (Malcom Yapp, Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2002. © 1993-2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.)

The German philosopher Hegel is one of the most important thinkers to have written philosophical world history. He believes that history is a gradual revolution of human nature. Human beings are what human beings are capable of doing, and this they reveal in what they actually have done in history. Other philosophical world historians have viewed human nature and hence history as expressing a struggle for power (Polybius) or a quest for knowledge (Auguste Comte). Hegel, however, believed that human beings harbor a striving for freedom or emancipation that, through most of history, has been blocked by one or another form of human bondage. He thus views history as the struggle for freedom in which we typically overcome one form of bondage only to fall into another form. Only at the end of history is freedom attained. The end game of history began roughly with the American and French Revolutions, and still today we are only in the middle of the end, with the end of the end not yet in sight.

After beginning in this chapter with 1. prehistory, we shall consider 2. the rise of the Chinese divine emperorship, 3. India's apparent escape from bondage through mysticism, 4. the Hebrew projection of divine lordship into the supernatural realm, 5. ancient Greece's disarming religion of beauty in which human beings are liberated from the security provided by an all-powerful lord, 6. the Roman philosophy of natural law that emancipates all human beings in principle if not in reality, 7. the Christian kingdom of God in which all human beings are free in heaven if not on earth, and 8. the beginning of the descent of the kingdom of heaven to earth in the human rights revolutions of the modern world.

At each stage of the way, we will pause to introduce and discuss philosophical problems, theories and concepts that arose historically in conjunction with that stage. We will see that to understand an historical people is to understand its philosophical world view, and we will see that for us to understand ourselves is to re-travel the historical pathway by which our consciousness has constructed itself out of the past standpoints of world history. Pre-history, China, India, the Hebrews, etc., already all roam about in each of our minds, and this introduction to philosophy will help make you aware of the fact.

2. Introduction to Metaphysics

This chapter, which focuses on prehistory, also contains an introduction to *metaphysics*. Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that seeks to discover the ultimate nature of reality. Along with *epistemology*, the philosophy of knowledge, it is the most important branch of *theoretical philosophy*. It seeks to discern the *reality* behind mere *appearance*. Common sense already distinguishes between reality and appearance—for example, the reality of an honest man versus the mere appearance of one. Metaphysics takes this distinction and pushes it further. Thus what we call the reality of a dishonest man, in relation to the mere appearance of a honest man, may turn out to be itself mere appearance in relation to the underlying reality of atoms in motion.

The connection between prehistory and metaphysics lies in the fact that all human beings, even in prehistory, have metaphysical beliefs about what is ultimately real and what is merely apparent, what merely seems to be real, e.g., what is illusory or even hallucinatory. Having an *illusion* is seeing something that is real while placing it under some description that does not correctly apply to it. Having an *hallucination* is believing that one sees something that is real, e.g., a pink elephant or puddle on the highway, while it is not real at all. If the materialist metaphysics that says only atoms exist is true, we are having illusions when we think stones exist, since we do not realize that they are only collections of atoms. I am going to argue that we modern Westerners are suffering from an illusion when we think that purely physical objects exist, and that pre-historical human beings were probably closer to the truth in identifying souls or spirits as the reality underlying what we consider to be purely physical things.

The possibility of the metaphysical knowledge of reality has long been attacked by *metaphysical skeptics*. Today we may say that metaphysics is in better shape than it has been in centuries, since it has survived the most resolute attempts to falsify the possibility of metaphysical knowledge in the past couple centuries. Some philosophers, such as *Immanuel Kant*, have claimed that we can only know the appearance, how they appear to us, never the reality. The structure of our mind so affects and modifies what appears to us that we can never know what things in themselves are apart from how they appear to us.

...his [Kant's] Critique of Pure Reason (1781)... examined the bases of human knowledge... Kant differentiated modes of thinking into analytic and synthetic... An *analytic proposition* is one in which the predicate is contained in the subject, as in the statement "Black houses are houses." The truth of this type of proposition is evident, because to state the reverse would be to make the proposition self-contradictory. Such propositions are called analytic because truth is discovered by the analysis of the concept itself. *Synthetic propositions*, on the other hand, are those that cannot be arrived at by pure analysis, as in the statement "The house is black." All the common propositions that result from experience of the world are synthetic.

Propositions, according to Kant, can also be divided into two other types: empirical and a priori. *Empirical propositions* depend entirely on sense perception, but a priori propositions have a fundamental validity and are not

Kant claimed that *synthetic a priori knowledge* was possible. (See above box.) This consisted in *a priori* knowledge of synthetically true propositions. An example is "All events are caused." "All effects are caused" is analytic because the concept of being caused can be analyzed out of the concept of being an effect. But the concept of being caused cannot be analyzed out of the concept of being an event. It is synthetically or externally added to the concept of being an event. Yet no one in science doubts the deterministic belief that all events are caused. It is not more an more supported by scientific research into causes, but is assumed from the start by all such research. Since it is known independently of empirical verification, it is known *a priori* rather than *a posteriori*. It is a case synthetic *a priori* knowledge. But Kant did not consider it a piece of metaphysical knowledge, since it was knowledge of empirical events, not of trans-empirical realities such as God, atoms, or the soul.

I want to argue that there is no synthetic *a priori* knowledge for Kant, and that he misstated his own philosophy in suggested such knowledge. For Kant believes that "All events are caused" is true necessarily or *a priori* because all events are *phenomena* constituted by the imposition of the *category* of being caused by the human mind on *sensory data* as a necessary *condition of the possibility* of these sensory data becoming phenomenal objects of real experience. That is a mouthful, but what it really means is that events constituted as caused by the human mind are caused. And that makes the principle of causality, once its meaning is analyzed, analytic rather than synthetic.

Another supposed example of synthetic *a priori* knowledge is "Things that have the sense

quality of redness are extended or spread out in space.” To be red is, as G.E. Moore once argued, a simple, non-analyzable quality. You either know what it is by direct intuition or acquaintance or will never understand any analysis of definition into simpler qualities. Thus to be red is thus not by analysis to be extended in space. Yet it is impossible to imagine anything that is red lacking spatial extension. If you imagine something red losing area until its area altogether vanishes, by its loss of area it at once ceases to be red. Yet, Kant analyzes what is red as a sense datum constituted by imposition of the general form of spatiality (and temporality) on the original raw inputs in the human mind from the unknowable things in themselves outside the mind. These raw inputs fail to be intuited or sensed until they are subjected to the mind’s own essential form of spatiality.

Thus, upon analysis, “Red things are extended” ultimately turns out to be analytic: “Red things constituted by subjection to spatiality as a form of all sensibility is subjected to that form of sensibility.” The statement appeared to be synthetic only because it was not analyzed! Redness is internally a simple non-analyzable quality. But analysis means analyzing the thing’s necessary relational properties, not merely analyzing its internal properties. Analysis of a valley shows that by its very concept it must be surrounded by hills and mountains. Analysis of the concept of being a parent shows that a parent must have children. And analysis of a red sense object for Kant shows that it must express the forms of sensibility of the human mind. If this is correct, Kant has failed to prove *synthetic a priori*, and we must go back to the traditional view that all knowledge is either *synthetic a posteriori* (verifiable by an appeal to experience after the statement has been understood) or *analytic a priori*.


Other metaphysical skeptics, the so-called *logical positivists*, have argued that it is not just *false* but *meaningless* to make statements about God, atoms, or the soul that cannot be empirically verified by our sensory observations. According to the positivists the meaning of a statement lies in the method of its empirical verification. Thus the meaning of the statement “God exists” is the same as that of the statement that tells us how we can verify “God exists:” “If we look at the world we will find more design than can be accounted for merely by human or other natural designers such as beavers.” Note that this second statement makes no reference at all to anything supernatural or metaphysical. Thus if the statement “God exists” is meaningful it is not metaphysical, and if it is metaphysical it is not meaningful. In fact, if it is metaphysical it is nonsensical.

Positivism, system of philosophy based on experience and empirical knowledge of natural phenomena, in which metaphysics and theology are regarded as inadequate and imperfect systems of knowledge. Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2002. © 1993-2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. he early maintained that all meaningful statements are either logical or empirical.

Ayer, Sir Alfred Jules (1909-1989)... According to his [early logical positivist] principle of verification, a statement is considered empirical only if some sensory observation is relevant to determining its truth or falseness. Sentences that are neither logical nor empirical—including traditional religious, metaphysical, and ethical sentences—are judged nonsensical. Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2002. © 1993-2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

The twentieth century philosopher of science Karl Popper did not argue like the logical positivists that metaphysics is meaningless, but he did argue that it is non-scientific. Scientific hypotheses, he said, were distinguished by being falsifiable, not by being verifiable as the positivists believed. General statements such as formulation of the causal laws of nature cannot be shown to be true by a process of verification, since even if there are a billion billion examples confirming the

hypothesis one counter-example would suffice to refute. Thus, instead of looking for positive evidence, science must look for negative evidence. It is a process of conjecture and refutation. A scientific hypothesis is which is falsified by the outcome of some imaginable experiment. Metaphysical hypotheses, he said, are hypotheses for which no negative evidence is conceivable. Thus, the principle that all events are caused is metaphysical because it is impossible to test the principle by exactly repeating a past causal situation to see if the second time around the effect is exactly the same. For if some past situation were exactly repeated in the present, it would be the present and not any past situation.



Sir Karl Popper (1902-1994)

Still other philosophers distinguish with *P.F. Strawson* between *descriptive metaphysics* and *revisionary metaphysics*. Descriptive metaphysics describes the ordinary *conceptual scheme* which we use. Revisionary metaphysics, which has been described as “news from nowhere,” tells us that this is a very different world from what he had always supposed. In effect, it revises our descriptive metaphysics. An example of revisionary metaphysics is *F.H. Bradley*’s theory that time is unreal. Strawson has argued that descriptive metaphysics is acceptable, while revisionary metaphysics is not. A major problem with revisionary metaphysics is that we cannot really drop the revisionary metaphysics or ordinary conceptual scheme which we regularly use. Thus Bradley may say that time is unreal, but he still knows that he goes to bed at time *before* he gets up the next morning.

Bradley, Francis Herbert (1846-1924), English philosopher and exponent of absolute idealism, a system that conceives the whole of reality to be the product of the mind rather than an object perceived by the senses. His philosophy drew heavily on the work of the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2002. © 1993-2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

In his work *Individuals* (1959; 2nd ed. 1965), [P.F.] Strawson [1919-] engages in what he called descriptive metaphysics [as contrasted to revisionary metaphysics], an effort to describe how people think about the world. He concludes that the categories “material body” and “person” have a primary place in the conceptual structuring of the world. Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2002. © 1993-2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

The best reply to Kant’s objection to metaphysics is that we along with the whole world of appearances fall within reality, not outside it. Thus when we know ourselves and know the appearance of things, we know something of reality. We may not know the whole of reality, but we do have partial knowledge of it. And partial knowledge of the whole partakes of total knowledge of it. This was essentially the reply given by Hegel.

The best reply to logical positivism is that the *verifiability principle*, which says that a statement's meaning lies in the method of its verification, cannot be the correct principle of meaningfulness, since we must first understand what a statement means before we can even raise the question as how to verify it. If we do not know what "God exists" or "Atoms exist" means we cannot begin to ask what observational statements would verify it.

The best reply to Karl Popper is that some metaphysical hypothesis appear to be scientific and some do not. A metaphysical hypothesis is not defined as one which is non-falsifiable by any imaginable observation. Rather, we shall define it below as statement either about everything that exists (*ontology*), or about everything that exists in the world of space-time relations (*cosmology*), or about that outside of which there is nothing (*theology*). Therefore, metaphysics is defined by the extreme *generality* or *inclusiveness* of its subject matter. It is not defined by the method of verifying or falsifying its hypotheses. All other sciences are defined by their subject matter. Mathematics is about numbers, chemistry about atoms and molecules, and so forth. So it is not clear why metaphysics should be the exception through being defined by its method, especially when the alleged method defines metaphysical knowledge out of existence. We may agree that the very general metaphysical (cosmological) hypothesis that every body in the natural world moves is not falsifiable by any predicted sensory observations. But it would be falsifiable by *conceptual analysis* if analysis of the concept of motion showed that the concept is incoherent or contradictory.

The best reply to Strawson and other so-called analytic philosophers, beginning with *G.E. Moore*, who criticize revisionary metaphysics is that metaphysics need be neither merely descriptive nor merely revisionary. I shall call the metaphysics that combines dimensions of both descriptive and revisionary metaphysics *accommodationist* metaphysics. Such metaphysics retains all the entities to which commonsense language refers. Such language gives us orientation in the world. It provides us with a map of all reality on which we are able to locate ourselves. For example, by a common conceptual map we are ninety-three thousand miles from the sun, we are more than two thousand years after the birth of Christ, and we exemplify organic life.

Philosophy, for [G.E.] Moore, was basically a two-fold activity. The first part involves analysis, that is, the attempt to clarify puzzling propositions or concepts by indicating less puzzling propositions or concepts to which the originals are held to be logically equivalent. Moore was perplexed, for example, by the claim of some philosophers that time is unreal. In analyzing this assertion, he maintained that the proposition "time is unreal" was logically equivalent to "there are no temporal facts." ("I read the article yesterday" is an example of a temporal fact.) Once the meaning of an assertion containing the problematic concept is clarified, the second task is to determine whether or not justifying reasons exist for believing the assertion. Moore's diligent attention to conceptual analysis as a means of achieving clarity established him as one of the founders of the contemporary analytic and linguistic emphasis in philosophy.... He came to the defense of the commonsense point of view which suggests that experience results in knowledge of an external world independent of the mind. (Robert M. Baird, Microsoft ® Encarta ® Encyclopedia 2002. © 1993-2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved)

Accommodationist metaphysics accommodates the existence of whatever commonsense and ordinary language refers to, but it does not necessarily accommodate the descriptions under which commonsense refer to things. It assumes that commonsense successfully refers to something called "Christ" or "the sun", and "organic life." It thus assumes that Christ, the sun, and the character of being organic life really exist. But it does not assume that Christ, the sun, or the character of being organic life really exists under any such commonsense description of being. Commonsense may successfully refer to

something under a false description, even under a contradictory description.

Accommodationist metaphysics thus allows itself to revise the descriptions used by commonsense even though it never challenges the reference of commonsense language. For instance, if the concept of being a material thing or person would turn out to be incoherence, the concept of being the sun or Christ would also be incoherent. For the sun is a material thing, while Christ is a person. Accommodationist metaphysics would then have to look for some *successor concept* for the concept of being a sun or being Christ. Yet throughout all such re-description the man or woman of commonsense would never become disoriented, since the familiar referents of commonsense and ordinary language would be maintained. The psychological need to place oneself on the map of the world used in ordinary life would continue to be satisfied.

In this book, we shall practice accommodationist metaphysics. One way to say this is to say that we shall not seek to shock people of commonsense by suggesting that they are hallucinating. We will at most suggest that they are sometimes caught up in illusions, i.e., in false descriptions that are nonetheless practically successful in helping people single out what really exists. Ultimately a true description of whatever exists would require analysis of the simple non-compound properties that it has. Thus being triangular is a compound property that depends on human compounding of simpler properties such as being three-sided, being a figure, being closed, and being plane. Since triangularity is none of these simpler properties, it disappears into the properties by which it is analyzed. If the ancient Greek philosopher Zeno is right, being in motion is compounded out of now being at rest in one place and later being at rest at another place. Motion dissolves into properties of being at rest that are quite the opposite of the property of motion. In this sense, triangularity and motion are illusory.

The compound *statement* that analyzes the seemingly simpler statement "Bodies move" corresponds more closely to the compound *fact* referred to by that statement than that statement itself does. A metaphysically ideal true statement would match its corresponding fact perfectly. Every property exemplified by some entity in the fact would be explicitly attributed to (predicated of) the entity in the corresponding statement (proposition). Thus the fact that something is green obtains if and only if the statement in which greenness is attributed to the entity is true. No property attributed in any metaphysically satisfactory statement would be illusory, since every attributed property would be actually instantiated (exemplified) by the entity in question. Such a maximally analytic compound statement would of course be quite cumbersome to make or use in ordinary speech. Its interest would not lie in any role it has as a statement in *ordinary language*, but as a proposition in a *metaphysically ideal language*. Statements in such an ideal language would have structures that mirror the minute structure of facts.

[Bertrand] Russell, strongly influenced by the precision of mathematics, was concerned with developing an ideal logical language that would accurately reflect the nature of the world. Complex propositions, Russell maintained, can be resolved into their simplest components, which he called atomic propositions. These propositions refer to atomic facts, the ultimate constituents of the universe. The metaphysical view based on this logical analysis of language and the insistence that meaningful propositions must correspond to facts constitute what Russell called logical atomism. His interest in the structure of language also led him to distinguish between the grammatical form of a proposition and its logical form. Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2002. © 1993-2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

“John is tall” and “The present king of France is bald” have similar grammatical forms in English, but they have different logical forms. The second statement is illusory as a single subject-predicate statement attributing one predicate to a single subject. If this second statement were truly a subject-predicate statement, we would have to say that there really is a present king of France who has the property of being bald. Yet we all know that there is no present king of France. In reality the fact to which that second statement refers, according to Russell, is a compound of three facts: 1. there is a present king of France, 2. all present kings of France are identical, 3. all present kings of France are bald. The possible fact that the present king of France is bald is not an actual fact. But the reason is not because there is a present king of present who has the property of being non-bald. The reason is that the first conjunct in the above conjunction of three conjuncts is false.

I have already committed myself to accommodationist metaphysics as a solution to the conflict between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. It is now apparent that this accommodationist metaphysics, by its distinction between illusory and real description, lead to some version of Bertrand Russell’s ideal language metaphysics, otherwise known as *logical atomism*. The main qualification, which I shall introduce in a later chapter, has to do with whether general properties or characteristics open to multiple exemplification by different instances really exist. However, whether or not greenness really exists as a possible property of different things, our subject-predicate language requires us to speak as if it did exist. And this means, I think, that we must talk as if an ideal language analyzing the facts to which we refer in ordinary speech were possible.

Since I claim that my philosophical position is also Hegelian, my commitment to Russell’s program of logical analysis and metaphysically ideal language leads me to analytic Hegelianism, or more precisely ideal language Hegelianism. Curiously, Bertrand Russell started his career as an analytic philosopher by revolting against Hegel. I thus seem to be in the position of trying to lead analytic philosophy back to Hegel. Yet I want to include *relational properties* within the analysis of any fact short of the fact that the world is in whatever state it is in. That the sun exists cannot be an *atomic fact*, since its analysis includes the relational fact that it warms the earth, that it lights up the earth, that it attracts the earth, and for forth. Russell seems to have been wrong in assuming that all analysis ends in a plurality of externally related atomic facts. That assumption was attractive because it seemed to allow complete analysis of ordinary facts such as the existence of the sun. But it is a mistake to suppose that the sun’s existence is an atomic fact merely as a requirement of complete analysis of the fact. Our analysis of facts must adapt the nature of the facts themselves, and not the other way around.

Ultimately the existence of the sun is an astronomical expression of the cosmos, what Hegel more abstractly called the absolute, in this cosmic epoch. Thus a complete description of the sun refers to the universe that also expresses itself in countless other ways. This means that no analysis of the existence of the sun is ever likely to be complete. The metaphysically ideal language is condemned to remain merely ideal. Yet some human language is closer to the ideal than other uses of language, and the impossibility of realizing a perfect ideal language should not deter us from getting as close to such a language as possible. Whatever improvements in analysis we accomplish are parts of the fully successful analysis that is always under construction. And since the part always partakes of the whole, the whole already has at least imperfect existence in the part.

In this chapter numerous metaphysical terms will be first introduced and defined. In the

eighteenth-century metaphysics was divided into *ontology* or general metaphysics and three branches of special metaphysics. *General metaphysics* was the metaphysics of *being qua being*, which means being merely insofar as it is being and not some special kind of being. Whatever has being may be said to exist. Existence is the property of having properties. Different things must each have a different set of properties.

The three branches of *special metaphysics* each concern a special type of being: 1. *theology*, which is concerned with God; 2. *cosmology*, which deals with the natural world, and 3. *psychology*, which deals with mind. Theology as a branch of metaphysics was called rational theology in contrast to the revealed theology derived from the *Bible*. The rational theologian uses logical argument without relying on faith or supernatural authority. Similarly, cosmology was rational cosmology because the rational methods of the metaphysician in his or her armchair and library differ from the empirical and experimental methods of the physicist.

I am saying very little of rational psychology here because I will argue that there are only two branches of special metaphysics: theology and cosmology, dealing respectively with that outside of which there is nothing and everything in space and time that is. The special branch of metaphysics that is cosmology is still very general. It deals with universal features of everything in the natural world, and these features may or may not include mental characteristics. If mental characteristics are not found throughout nature, and if they are not found in God conceived as that outside of which nothing exists, I will argue that they are of no concern to metaphysics. It is apparent that the special branch of metaphysics known as rational theology is also very general, since everything in nature will necessarily be included in God and thus will be modified by God.

I shall argue that the pre-historical world view is "panentheistic" in its theory of God (theology), and "panpsychist" in its theory of the world (cosmology). "Panentheism" means everything ("pan") is in ("en") God ("theos"); while "panpsychism" means that everything ("pan") has a mind or soul ("psyche"). The first three sections concern pre-historical religion in relation to religion in general, and in relation to three basic theologies in particular: pantheism (found in India, but also found in the philosophy of Spinoza), theism (e.g., the Hebrews), and panentheism.

...while theism (belief in a supreme being) emphasizes divine transcendence and pantheism (belief that God is the sum of all things) identifies God with the world order, in panentheism God is understood as both transcendent and immanent.

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Pantheism says that everything in the world mystically *is* God. Theism says that God is beyond the world as created. Panentheism denies that things in the world are each identical to God, but it also denies that God is merely beyond things in this world. God in part transcends everything in the world, but God is also partly immanent in (present in) everything in the world. Everything in the world is contained in God, and God is the whole that embraces everything (and every person). Hegel was a panentheist, and his basic argument was that pantheism ignores obvious distinctions between things in equating them all with God, while theism makes God limited or finite in supposing that he transcends things that lies outside him.

The fourth section treats the story of the Fall in reference to the herding and agricultural revolutions. The chapter concludes with Sections V through VII, which examine three views of the cosmos: panpsychism (animism), mind-matter dualism, and materialism. These views are examined both in relation to their possible truth, and in relation to the cultures in which they are found and which they help illuminate.

The pantheism considered in the next chapter on India is limited to patriarchal, historical civilization. Considerable practice is required in abstract thought to conceive a single cosmic substance distinct from the allegedly illusory things and persons of the world. The ability to think so abstractly is not yet realized in the mythical thinking of prehistorical cultures.

The Chinese reference to Heaven (*t'ien*) has often been viewed as pantheistic. But this interpretation predates the nineteenth century addition of panentheism to theism and pantheism as a third great theological option. Heaven in Confucianist China does not exist to the exclusion of earth. Earth is neither a creation of nor an illusory manifestation of Heaven. Rather, Heaven embraces earth. Confucianism is thus panentheistic rather than pantheistic. Earth is in Heaven. In China panentheism justifies the earthly patriarchal despotism of the Emperor, while Brahmanist pantheism in India offers an escape from despotism altogether.

Indian pantheism and Chinese panentheism will reveal alternative non-supernaturalist forms of patriarchal despotism. We will see patriarchal despotism take supernaturalist forms among the ancient Egyptians, the Hebrew, Greeks, and Romans in the West. For Westerners to study Eastern Brahmanist and Confucianist world views is not to uncover further hidden layers of their own historical identity. Rather, it is to illuminate that Western identity by contemplating alternative Eastern identities never specifically realized in the West. Divine emperorship existed in Egypt. In China it existed in a non-individualistic form, without an after-world beyond natural world. The West discovered this Chinese idea after Marco Polo.

The deepest layer of our identity, however, is a prepatriarchal and prehistorical identity common to both Easterners and Westerners. Out of the several million years of human existence, hardly six thousand have been spent in history. It is not surprising that prehistory should make an enduring contribution to our identity.

III. *Theologies and Cosmologies*

Cosmology is the theory of the universal characteristics of all *entities* (things that are) throughout space and time. In particular it is the theory of all natural substances. A natural substance occurs within the natural world of things and persons that are temporally and/or spatially related. It is not supernatural. A substance as understood in philosophy is not the same thing as a substance in chemistry. We will analyze the concept more precisely in the next chapter, but as a first approximation we may say that a natural substance is something that is *undivided* or *individual*, and that is essentially could exist by itself even if nothing else existed.

Three basic options in cosmology are materialism, dualism, and idealism. *Materialism* asserts that natural substances are all purely “physical” as the science of physics understands that term.

Idealism asserts that natural substances are not merely physical but are mental in character. *Dualism* asserts that some natural substances are purely physical, while others are not purely physical but are in part or wholly mental. A mental substance is defined as one that is not merely physical. It may have physical characteristics, but it also has irreducible mental characteristics. Other than materialism, idealism, and dualism, the only remaining position in cosmology seems to be a skeptical denial that we know the nature of some or all natural substances.

Note that the number of material substances in the natural world might be more than or only one. Similarly, the number of minds in the natural space-time world might be more than one or only one. If there is only one material substance, we have *monistic materialism*, while otherwise we have *pluralistic materialism*. We can also distinguish between *monistic idealism* and *pluralistic idealism*.

Theology is the theory of God viewed as a privileged entity: that outside of which there is nothing. A material substance might exist even if nothing else existed, but as a matter of fact other material substances exist alongside, or before and after it. There can be nothing outside God, since if there were God would be externally affected by it and would be passive or finite. This seems to imply that the very definition of God rules out theism. In fact, we shall consider theism one of the three basic concepts of God only to its popularity in the West, not due to any logical coherence in the concept. The equally basic three options in theology, we have said, are pantheism, theism, and panentheism.

Pantheism denies all that is except God, reducing cosmology to theology. Moreover, pantheism is incapable of positively describing what is in space and time, whether in materialistic, dualistic, or idealistic terms. Matter, mind, or a combination of matter and mind exists only as illusory. There is a cosmology distinct from theology only in theism and panentheism.

In theism this cosmology is either dualistic, idealistic, or materialistic. According to Descartes' dualistic theism, God and the human soul are mental substances while the rest of the world is of a material substance. In Leibniz's idealistic theism, on the other hand, the non-divine world through space and time consists in mental or soul-like substances which he calls "monads." Theism in a very general sense even allows that God might have created a purely material world. Such a God would differ from the Biblical God in having no fellowship with souls created in His image. The assertion of such a God has sometimes been called "deism."



René Descartes (1596-1650)



Leibniz (1646-1716)



Spinoza (1632-1677)

In panentheism, non-divine entities might conceivably be material, mental, or both, and we accordingly may distinguish materialistic, idealistic, and dualistic panentheism. Non-divine entities may include substances, which is to make God the aggregate of such substances. This position may be called pluralistic panentheism. Or non-divine entities may all be parts of one divine substance. This we shall call monistic panentheism. The kind of panentheism examined in this chapter is an interpretation of the "animism" of prehistorical hunting-gathering tribes. Animism is the belief that nature is pervaded by soul life, the spirit of the mountain, the sun, the moon, etc. It is an idealistic and pluralistic panentheism in which many substantial individual spirits are microcosms communicating within their macrocosmic aggregate.

As a philosophical theory, animism, usually called panpsychism, is the doctrine that all objects in the world have an inner or psychological being... Since the late 19th century, however, the term has been mainly associated with anthropology and the British anthropologist Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, who described the origin of religion and primitive beliefs in terms of animism... According to Tylor, primitive peoples, defined as those without written traditions, believe that spirits or souls are the cause of life in human beings; they picture souls as phantoms, resembling vapors or shadows, which can transmigrate from person to person, from the dead to the living, and from and into plants, animals, and lifeless objects. In deriving his theory, Tylor assumed that an animistic philosophy developed in an attempt to explain the causes of sleep, dreams, trances, and death; the difference between a living body and a dead one; and the nature of the images that one sees in dreams and trances... Related to animism are ancestor worship and some forms of nature worship. Microsoft © Encarta © Encyclopedia 2002. © 1993-2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

IV. *The General Nature of Religion*

Thinkers like Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx have predicted the "end of religion." But what they predict is only the end of religion in its "highest," *theistic* creationist form. Religion in this form projects our own humanity beyond ourselves as God, the all-powerful Creator whom we would wish to be but know we are not. On this view, the realization of our humanity requires atheism, the retrieval of our humanity from God. Feuerbach viewed Christianity as the essence of such religion.

Religion, at least the Christian, is the relation of man to himself, or more correctly to his own nature (i.e., his subjective nature); but a relation to it, viewed as a nature apart from his own. The divine thing is nothing else than the human thing, or, rather, the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective--i.e., contemplated and revered as another, distinct being. (Feuerbach, *Essence of Christianity*, 14)

In the form of *pantheism*, religion reaches and transcends the highest level of abstraction. The concept of pure being, of merely being without being anything in particular, leads beyond itself to mystical intuition of something non-conceptual. But should the Freudian view (discussed below) prove right, this non-conceptual object of intuition is recollected from our original biological situation in the womb prior to all abstract thought.



THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach (1804-1872)

Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach was a 19th-century German philosopher. His ideas influenced German political philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

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
In the form of *panentheism*, theology is reformulated without theism's seemingly paradoxical projection of the infinite outside of the finite, as if the infinite were limited by the finite, contradictorily making itself finite. But panentheism equally rejects the paradoxical identification of the finite and the infinite which we find in pantheism, which makes the finite as such illusory. Whereas pantheism aims at a non-social experience of identity with the infinite, panentheism (combined with an idealistic and pluralistic cosmology) achieves a social experience of being **in** the infinite with other finite beings.

In Chapter Two we examined a panentheistic interpretation of Christian theology alongside the more traditional theistic interpretation. The present chapter examines panentheism as an interpretation of a dominant form of prehistorical religion. We suggest panentheism as an interpretation of animistic polytheism, of the prehistorical reverence for the souls and of various things and elements in the world. This interpretation supposes that the apparent plurality of gods conceals an underlying deification the one all-embracing *macrocosm* (macro-cosmos, large-scale world), which *microcosmic individuals* manifest in different ways. If panentheism were a viable interpretation of *both* the incarnation of the cosmic Christ in the finite *and* the presence in individual spirits of cosmic energy, a convergence would emerge between Christianity and "primitive" religion. The same truth enjoyed in early prehistory prior to the "Fall" (Section IV) appears as the truth to which Christianity returns after the Fall.

This persistence of religion from the earliest prehistory to the modern Christian world suggests the possibility that religion may be a universal human phenomenon. The philosopher-theologian *Paul Tillich* has argued that humans everywhere have some kind of religion, some *object of ultimate concern*. For some it may be money, for others power, and for still others, God under some traditional description. Yet to have religion it is not enough to attach oneself to an ultimate value. The very essence of religion is to affirm the omnipotence of that value. Religion is not just wishful thinking, not just a description of what is most desirable; it is also a source of support in crisis. Fundamentally, it may be suggested, *religion* is the belief that one is not alone, that one's deepest value (the object of one's ultimate concern) does not stand defenseless before the forces of nature, but is ultimately backed up and undergirded by those very forces.



Tillich
Paul Tillich
(1885-1965)



Encarta Encyclopedia, THE BETTMANN
ARCHIVE/Corbis
Bertrand Russell
(1872-1970)



Encarta Encyclopedia, Culver Pictures
Albert Camus (1913-1960)

Many philosophers would contest the assumption that there is an essence to religion, or for that matter to any class of phenomena. But the abstract essence in question here is realized only concretely in this situation or that. It becomes determinate in one situation as magic and in another as self-surrender, in one as surrender to a cult of power and in another to the power of reason. Through all this variation abstract belief in the irresistible power of some value remains. This general belief, uniting vast numbers of human beings in their differences, is most easily referred to as "religion."


Animistic polytheism qualifies as religious in this sense. True, the spirits of various natural objects and elements are finite, hence not divine. But a belief to divinity is put forth by the magician who taps infinite cosmic power (mana) in casting spells over natural spirits. Animistic polytheism is a kind of pantheism: the finite spirits of nature are embraced in the infinite divine force of the cosmos.

It is perhaps less obvious than Tillich thought that every human being yields to the religious tendency in this sense. In the twentieth century, atheistic thinkers such as Albert Camus (1913-1960), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) have developed considerable pride over the defiantly humanistic awareness of standing uncompromisingly alone in the face of ultimately triumphant but inhuman forces of nature. They may go down, but they will go down fighting.

Resistance to religion becomes understandable if we reflect that religious belief as defined above appears to contradict the testimony of ordinary experience. By this testimony human beings are essentially insecure, vulnerable, and finite. They are dependent on an alien environment which they can never completely control. They are born into a hostile world on which they nonetheless vitally depend. But it is difficult to accept the apparently obvious fact of mere human finitude. Humans have intimations of their essential identity with the infinite. Pantheism interprets this identity as identity without difference. The main question is whether such intimations lead to self-deception, or whether there is truth in them.



Jean Paul-Sartre (1905-1980)



Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)

Pantheism may not appear true. But we may all have been pantheists at one time, and so at a certain level of regression may still all be pantheists to some degree. A pantheistic conviction as to our deep-lying infinitude has been explained (not justified) in our own century from an unsuspected source. *Sigmund Freud*, it is well known, held that our tendency to believe in our essential invulnerability and omnipotence is based in a postnatal recollection of the prenatal experience of total security which the human infant had in its mother's womb. The human species is distinguished by a prolonged prenatal life in the womb. It is not unreasonable to suppose that these nine months of relative bliss, protected from the rude shocks of this world, should exercise an appeal in postnatal life. This pantheistic intimation of infinitude is called by Freud the "oceanic feeling." To say that we tend to identify with God may amount to saying that the oceanic feeling is natural by virtue of our biological situation. This is not to suggest that the oceanic feeling or pantheism is essential to religion. It is to suggest that religion in all passes through a pantheistic phase.

Freud considered himself an atheist. He wished to explain religion, but also to explain away its alleged truth. But the conclusion that there is no God does not logically follow from the theory of the oceanic feeling. The oceanic feeling may be a biologically-based mechanism by which we draw closer to God under a pantheistic description (or misdescription) despite our ordinary experience of being limited by an external world. There actually exists a reality which is independent, infinite, and unlimited. The God of pantheism or panentheism some philosophers call the "cosmos": it is the universe which is unlimited. If it were not all-encompassing, if it were relative to something apart from it, it simply would not be the universe.

V. *The Religion of Magic*

So far we have been speaking of religion in very abstract terms. We have suggested original pantheistic and subsequent panentheistic layers of all religion: the human being's vague pre-natal intimation of being infinite, followed by a post-natal feeling of being in the infinite along with other finite spirits of nature. But if we restrict ourselves merely to this, we have a very undeveloped notion of religion.

Still, it is with this undeveloped notion of religion that we would begin if we followed the method of proceeding from the simple to the complex. We would reconstruct the development of religion from its simple to complex forms. We would see how the world religions can be reconstructed in

an understandable order of increasing complexity. And we would seek to relate this order to that of their historical emergence.

Most of all, we should remember that our purpose is philosophical. Religion or the criticism of it has the same subject matter as philosophy. The power of religion in forming the character of peoples helps us understand world cultures better by making religion's philosophical content explicit.


Some philosophy is religiously skeptical. But even so religion remains its subject matter. Religion is not universal in the open belief of all individuals and peoples. Hinyana Buddhism lacks a God (except as a kind of theatrical prop sustaining the practice of meditation). It lacks any religious belief in an inevitable triumph of nirvana. Some cultures or individuals are understandable only by their peculiar critique of religion.

Philosophy and the attitude towards religion remain not only intrinsically interesting but also a universal key to understanding others. This is because philosophical belief, reflected in action and not just words, is presupposed by so many apparently non-philosophical actions and beliefs. To drive to work pantheistically, secure in the belief in one's ultimate identity with the on-coming cars, is not to do so theistically, depending on faith to determine which cars may be elected for salvation.

In reconstructing religion, we would begin with the earliest of religions, that of prehistorical mankind, the religion of animistic polytheism and magic. But the religion of animism and magic has itself a complex development. Animism by itself, without the recourse to magic, expresses an undisturbed harmony with nature. According to the modern philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the original state of humanity--in which modest natural needs were met without disciplined labor by the bountifulness of natural vegetation and animal life--is one of childhood, innocence, moral purity, and oneness with nature. This original condition of humanity has, ever since Rousseau's celebration of the "noble savage," exercised an attraction on modern romantics:

If we strip this [human] being... of all the supernatural gifts he may have received, and all the artificial faculties he can have acquired only by a long process, if we consider him, in a word, just as he must have come from the hands of nature, we behold in him an animal weaker than some, less agile than others but, taking him all round, the most advantageously organized of any. I see him satisfying his hunger at the first oak tree, and slaking [quenching] his thirst at the first brook, finding his bed at the foot of the tree which afforded him a repast; and, with that, all his wants supplied.... The horse, the cat, the bull, and even the ass are generally of greater stature, and always more robust... when they run wild in the forests than when bred in the stall. By becoming domesticated, they lose half these advantages.... It is thus with man also: as he becomes sociable and a slave he grows weak, timid and servile.... The several conveniences in which men indulge themselves still more than do the beasts are so many additional causes of their deeper degeneracy. (Jean-Jacques Rousseau)

Rousseau, who came from a strongly religious Calvinist background, may be viewed as trying to interpret basic concepts of Genesis as referring to certain real events of prehistory. The Garden of Eden in which Adam and Eve lived before the Fall has often been equated with Paradise, so that the Fall has been equated with the *loss* of Paradise. In the pessimistic outlook of romantics like Rousseau, history has been one of degeneration, of an irreversible *falling away* from a primitive Golden Age in which we lived wisely and happily in unison with nature.



Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)

It is not difficult to criticize this romantic vision. The contemporary philosopher-anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss writes:

To be sure, the term *primitive* now seems to be safe from the confusion inherent in its etymological meaning and reinforced by an obsolete evolutionism. A primitive people is not a backward or retarded people; indeed, it may possess, in one realm or another, a genius for invention or action that leaves the achievements of civilized peoples far behind.... Nor do primitive peoples lack history, although its development often eludes us.... Second, owing to the archaic nature of their techniques and institutions, these peoples recall what we have been able to reconstruct about the social organization of peoples that lived ten or twenty thousand years ago. Hence the conclusion that they remain today just as they were in that remote period. We leave it to philosophy to explain why in some cases something happened and why in other cases nothing happened.... There seems to be no doubt that... true archaism is the realm of the archeologist and the prehistorian, but that the social anthropologist who studies contemporary societies should not forget that they must have lived, endured, and, therefore, changed. A true primitive society should be harmonious, a society so-to-speak one with itself. We have seen on the contrary that... societies which appear to be the most authentically archaic are completely distorted by discrepancies that bear the unmistakable mark of *elapsed time*. A cracked bell, alone surviving the work of time, will never give forth the ring of bygone harmonies." (Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*)



Keystone Pressdienst GmbH

Claude Lévi-Strauss French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss based his understanding of culture on studies of people's languages and recurring patterns of thought and behavior. His cultural theories are associated with the anthropological movement known as structuralism.

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For most of us the problem with Rousseau's primitivist romanticism is not with the ideal of oneness with nature. On the contrary, the ideal of the identity of *subject* and *object* (mind and matter, spirit and nature, humankind and its natural environment) stands at the center of today's ecological

perspective. In many ways today, we seek to diminish our alienation from an urban world by surrounding ourselves with vegetation (e.g., suburban yards) and animal life (e.g., pets).

Yet this original identity cannot have been a self-consciously realized identity of humanity and nature. Two things cannot be discovered to be identical until they have been singled out under different descriptions. Thus Superman cannot be *discovered* to be Clark Kent unless being Superman and being Clark Kent have first been *distinguished*. The prehistorical identity of spirit and nature is an immediate, undiscovered one. For the truth that humanity and nature are one to be known--for spirit's identity with nature to become self-conscious--it must first be denied. Humanity must first attempt to rise above nature and assert itself against it, in order to discover the ultimate futility of the attempt and the necessity of reconciliation with nature.

Interpreting Genesis as containing (among other things) poetic references to prehistory, it may be quipped that the Garden of Eden cannot have truly been Paradise. If it had been Paradise, it would never have been lost. "Paradise Lost" seems a contradiction. The Fall was necessary for humanity's ultimate self-realization. To be sure, humans were not evil before the Fall, but they were not really good either. Before the Fall, they lived in a plant-like or animal-like state of innocence. But because this state leaves unfulfilled potentials which set human beings apart from other living beings, it is a guilty innocence, an innocence which contradicts humanity's peculiar good. Human goodness lies in the overcoming of evil. Evil must therefore be committed for good to be done.

As traditionally understood in Christian culture, *evil* consists in the use of free will to assert oneself, one's private interest, apart from the welfare of some larger whole in which one is contained. *Goodness* consists in denying this egotistic, exclusive self-assertion through discovery of one's inseparability from this larger whole.

But while insisting that the Garden of Eden was not really Paradise, it is still possible to hold that it once existed, and indeed was original humanity's frequent state in the lush African environment in which social scientists believe the species originated. If so, the Hebrews who wrote Genesis doubtlessly had imperfect knowledge of the real truth-making facts to which they were referring in their assertions. But this does not prevent their contemporaries from coming upon such facts as a way of maintaining the non-mythical character of the biblical account.

Viewed economically, Adam and Eve before the Fall can be seen as food gatherers. Their life was surely nomadic and active, but they were provided with a plentiful supply of natural vegetation which made burdensome toil often unnecessary. Needs were less artificial than today, and as a rule were easily satisfied.

However, occasional emergencies or states of deprivation occurred even in Eden. In such emergencies, when they do not know how else to cope, humans resort to magic. The magic practiced at this primitive stage of human development may be called *immediate magic*. What this means is that human beings, in resorting to magic, seek to control a temporarily hostile nature by means of their own hidden powers, without reliance on the magical powers of external objects or beings. One may, for example, attempt to cause rain by orally commanding the skies, by uttering a magical formula to cast a spell over natural processes.

This practice of immediate magic approaches religion by its belief in a super-human empowerment of human aspirations. It reflects a belief in the omnipotence or at least extraordinary power of humanity. In religion the individual seeks to escape natural threats and deprivation by identifying with God, by putting oneself in the hands of God or divine providence. It may seem that, as a direct magician, one attributes an extraordinary power of control over nature to oneself. Still, in such magic a distinction emerges between the magician: (1) as a natural, ordinary, finite individual, and (2) as one with the extraordinary creative, cosmic power tapped in the use of magic.

The practice of magic requires that the individual, shaman, or witch doctor incorporate within him- or herself extraordinary creative power, that is, "mana." Once this extraordinary magical power is *objectified*, once it becomes something the magician is aware of, it is possible to speak of a "theology" behind the religion of magic. This religion of immediate magic, in which the magician invites possession by the extraordinary but normally hidden power of the cosmos, may be directed to the survival of the tribe. The individual then *uses* the extraordinary power more than he *worships* it. The element of reverence for God, in the realization of valid aims one may not understand, is missing. Yet this element may also be missing in modern theistic religion, where prayer may be utilized magically for the immediate aims of the individual. It seems hard to justify any claim that the modern religion of success by prayer is less "religious" than religion in which one places no ultimate value on one's conscious aims.

Magic (sorcery), art of attaining objectives, acquiring knowledge, or performing works of wonder through supernatural or nonrational means. Techniques used in magic typically include chants and spells, gestures or actions that often have a symbolic relation to the desired result (for example, acting out a successful hunt of the past to make a future hunt successful) [direct magic], and the use of substances believed to have a special relationship with the powers needed to accomplish the intended purpose [indirect magic]. Anthropologists distinguish three types of magical practice: homeopathic magic, or the use of small portions of a thing to represent and affect the whole; sympathetic magic, in which a symbolic action (for example, sticking pins into a doll) affects an object with which the symbol is in "sympathy" or harmony; and contagious magic, the influencing of one thing through contact with another that is believed to be magically charged. The theoretical foundation for most magical practices is a belief in correspondences, or hidden relationships among entities within the universe—especially between human beings and the external world. According to this view, the application of the right colors, objects, sounds, or gestures in a given context can bring about the desired result... Magic is widely practiced in primal and traditional societies. In such contexts magic is not simply a prescientific way of attaining practical ends—it may also involve at least a partial symbolic recognition of the society's spiritual world view and of its gods and myths. In this respect magic often merges with religion... Religion, however, is usually regarded as the public acknowledgment of spirituality, while magic tends to be private and oriented toward power and gain by supernatural means rather than toward worship. Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2002. © 1993-2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

VI. *The Fall From Paradise*

We have been discussing the emergence of religion in the Garden of Eden. Now let us look at what happens with the Fall according to the Genesis story. In the first place, humans are condemned to live by the sweat of their brow. Creative labor in the image of God lapses into a bondage to repetitive detail:

An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labor power to market for sale as a commodity from that state in which human labor was still in its first instinctive stages. We presuppose labor in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from

the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own... to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman's will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and [by] the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close is his attention forced to be. (Karl Marx)

Labor becomes the necessary means to human subsistence. *Labor* is distinguished from primitive food gathering and small-scale hunting in part by the making and use of *tools*, such as the bow and arrow and other weapons which were invented as humans became sophisticated hunters. Tools eventually created a new relation between humankind and nature. But the onset of this relation does not follow immediately on the invention of tools. Early tools are unique, personal, and empowered with magic. In the age of mass production to come, human tool users fall away from their prior unity with nature. They withdraw from nature to manipulate it in repetitive skilled routines, making it into the *other*, the other of spirit. They begin to see nature as a despiritualized system of interacting things.

This world-view, eventually deriving from the patriarchal revolution, is dualistic. It is mind-body dualism. A contrary animistic view was common as late as the middle ages, which largely adopted Aristotle's view that heavy objects fall downward because they aspire to reach their home among other heavy earth-bound objects. Fire rose because it was seemingly weightless: its home is with immaterial celestial objects. Dualism established itself firmly in philosophy only in the seventeenth century with Rene Descartes, "the father of modern philosophy":

...because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am a thinking being, and not extended (i.e., occupying volume), and on the other hand a distinct idea of body, in so far as it is only an extended thing, and not one that thinks, it is certain that I am in reality distinct from my body and can exist apart from it. (Descartes, *Meditation II*)

But dualism established itself less formally long before its formal emergence in Descartes' philosophy. It did so through the invention of disciplined labor. Before the emergence of labor in the agricultural and herding revolutions, at the stage of simple hunting and gathering, nature was alive with spirit and soul-life. The food gatherer, into whose hands ripened fruit fell, experienced nature as autonomous and self-creative. This primitive animism is presupposed by the attempt of direct magic to control nature by commanding it with magical formulas. (Yet direct magic did not consist in the "worship" of these nature spirits; they were poorer than the spirit which we muster in controlling them.). But as we developed into tool users, we began to calculate that if we performed such and such an operation, a given result would mechanically follow. We became disembodied *subjects* struggling against nature; our task was now to be a thinking thing, and to master nature reduced to a mere *object*. Knowledge became power.

The mental outlook of the tool user produces a corresponding form of magic. No matter how hard tool users labor, there will be times when they need to resort to magic. But the magic natural to a user of tools will be broader than the direct magic of a non-tool using gatherer. Immediate magic will be supplemented by *indirect magic*, which implies the magical power of "means" or external objects as

well as that of the magician. Magic will be broadened to allow for *magical tools*: charms, amulets, medicines, totems, and fetishes. But we must not suppose a neat division between magical tools and ordinary implements such as a bow and arrow. The way in which many an ordinary tool works is mysterious to its user and thus apparently magical.

In discussing direct magic, a distinction emerged between the ordinary person who resorts to magic and the extraordinary, creative power which must possess the successful magician. A similar distinction now occurs in indirect magic between the ordinary natural object and the extraordinary power which it manifests when used as a magical tool. The religion of indirect magic is a religion because it objectifies the extraordinary power which selected natural objects may manifest. It is the awareness of this power as something more than a mere natural object which is religious. Yet the distinction between the divine power and the ordinary object in which it resides may not be clearly made at the level of indirect magic. We are still dealing with a very primitive form of religion. The distinction may be felt but not yet made conceptually.

It may appear to an outsider who does clearly make this distinction that the hunting tribe worships ordinary finite objects, in contrast to the infinite cosmic power which may be accidentally manifest in those objects. But this may be a misunderstanding. The outside observer imposes on primitive experience a conceptual distinction which has no place in that experience.

The range of natural objects which can function as fetishes is broad: inanimate objects, animals, even human beings. The possibility of a human being serving as a magical tool is of particular interest in the transition from the religion of magic to the historical emperor worship of ancient Egypt, China, and Japan. The socioeconomic condition of this transition is the domestication of animals and the agricultural revolution, which created durable wealth, a need for servile labor, and an authoritarian-hierarchical social structure. With the creation of durable wealth--herds and farmlands--under patriarchal control, the community loses its freedom and subjects itself to the patriarchal leader. Individuals other than the leader view themselves as essentially dependent. They cease to attribute any magical power to themselves. Instead they turn to the patriarch-priest for the paternal, protective exercise of magical power.

At the first stage of this religion of priest fetishism there is no more reverence for the father-priest-magician than for any fetish. The father-priest is at first merely used as a magical tool, and tossed away in favor of some one else when his magic seems to work no longer. Fidelity to the priest emerges only after he has acquired the political power to punish infidelity, that is, only when he has become a patriarch. But further consideration of patriarchy--the political rule of the father-priest--takes us beyond prehistory and its religion of magic into the historical state and the political use of the religion of cosmic power. Our purpose has been to characterize the religion of magic in prehistory.

Reflecting on the views just summarized, one notices the degree to which they reflect evolutionary theories developed by Charles Darwin in the nineteenth century. The evolutionary interpretation of human prehistory has been widely criticized. The possibility of a single evolutionary sequence such as the one suggested has been frequently discounted. It is true that a "Garden of Eden" marked by an immediate unity between man and nature is incapable of empirical verification. Although there are primitive peoples who, at least until very recently, lived principally from food gathering, it is

speculative to identify such peoples as survivors of the first stage of humanity's existence. The arguments for the "Garden of Eden" hypothesis are theoretical rather than empirical. For example, the primates from which humanity is supposed to have descended are not meat-eaters.

Many anthropologists have taken an interest in the lack of social hierarchies within many hunter-gatherer cultures. Hunter-gatherer communities typically have much less pronounced differences of power, wealth, and prestige between individuals than in other societies. Evidence suggests that this equality does not result from the poverty these communities generally experience, but from a group ideology that stresses the moral value of sharing with the community rather than accumulating property.

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VII. *Theologies and Cosmologies Revisited*

Throughout this book various world-views have been introduced. In part the purpose has been to assist our understanding different cultures. Behind the contemporary human rights ideology we find a commonsense world of accidentally changeable *things* rightfully owned or not owned; and of *persons* with careers, who stake out claims socially recognized or not, morally justified or not.

Theology (reference to God) plays no direct role in this commonsense view, which is limited to a cosmology of *persons* (with both mental and physical states) and impersonal *things* limited to physical states. The twentieth-century philosophers G.E. Moore and P.F. Strawson, believe this commonsense cosmology to be universal among all cultures. Strawson has argued that such a cosmology is rooted in the *universal* linguistic institution of speaker reference to things as abiding points on any map of the world. If they are right, the non-theological cosmology of things and persons, being universal to all peoples, cannot help us understand *alien* peoples precisely insofar as they are *alien*, i.e., different from us.

The above suggests that a world-view illuminating an alien culture must include a theology or a cosmology going beyond a universal commonsense cosmology of things and persons. For example, behind the heretical Gnostic Christianity that we shall study in Chapter Seven is a theology of the divine spirit's self-division into good and evil, spirit and matter. Both matter and a triumphant struggle against it are included in the divine spirit in which we participate. Gnostic panentheism is a *moral panentheism*.

Let us suppose with the Gnostic tradition in Christianity that the good is identified with universal freedom of thought, and evil is identified with lordship and bondage. The philosophy of history that eventually results that lends theological support, we shall see, to a struggle for individual human rights (Joachim de Fiore).

In interpreting imperial Roman civilization in Chapter Six, we will consider Stoicism's panentheistic deification of natural law. The earthly state and its human law are temporary imperfect expressions of the divine *macrocosm*. Local human law may disguise as well as reveal the eternal intelligible law of the cosmic whole. The cosmopolis, includes, but is at once obscured by, the many *polises* or city-states. The divine macrocosm includes microcosms whose individual passions may obscure the rationality of the cosmic laws to individuals caught up in those microcosmic perspectives. We will call this ancient Stoic-based panentheism the *panentheism of natural law*. Natural law includes approximations to itself in universal human customary law (so-called *jus gentium*), but it also includes temporary deviations from itself in much legislated human civil law.

Behind Orthodox Christianity and Judaism is *theism*. It takes God to be the creator of the space-time order of mind and matter. The space-time world is neither evil nor embraced in any divine process which overcomes it. Contrary to Gnosticism, creation is essentially good.

The great artistic works of classical Greece (Chapter Five) will be interpreted in light of *aesthetic panentheism*. Natural things and especially human beings will be seen to express more or less imperfectly a divine model of beauty. This beauty is apprehended from a aesthetic standpoint of human confidence in the essential goodness and humanity of the world. The world is an essentially friendly place, in which our own human spirit appears to us in artistic beauty and in its natural and poetic settings.

The Brahmanist interpretation of the Indian caste system (Chapter Four) will depend on a *pantheism* which dismisses ordinary things and persons as illusory.

Chinese culture is illuminated by an *imperialistic panentheism* (Chapter Three). The Emperor is the agent of Heaven harmoniously embracing earth. In this popular Chinese panentheism, the cosmic spirit is eternal. It does not pass through a stage of necessary historical conflict with matter as in Gnostic panentheism. And its harmony with earth is not concealed to countless wayward members of the earthly city as in Stoic panentheism.

The world views distinguishing different cultures in world history include four types of panentheism: moral (Gnosticism), legal (Rome), aesthetic (Greece), and imperial (China). We may interpret prehistorical hunting-gathering in light of a fifth panentheism: magical animistic panentheism. The panentheistic theology is based on an animistic cosmology. Here the all-embracing whole is not, as in imperial panentheism, expressed by a single individual, an emperor. Rather, it is a spirit common to all finite nature spirits.

A complete *world-view* is a *cosmology* of all that is in space and time together with a *theology* of that-outside-of-which-there-is-nothing. A theology without a cosmology leaves the description of God indefinite. It offers no orientation or reference points for distinguishing God in a

context. Brahmanist pantheism is such a theology without a cosmology. Theism and panentheism offer more definite descriptions of God. We are told what God created or embraces.

A cosmology without a theology offers orientation in our immediate environment but does not satisfy a wish for *absolute orientation*. This is the wish to know where one is on a total map of reality. Knowing "where one is" should not be understood in a merely spatial sense. It means "how one stands in relation to all else." A cosmologist might provide changing *relative orientation* by showing we are currently north of something or another. Theologians claim we are unchangeably created by God, merely evolved from inanimate matter, or illusory manifestations of Being. They would provide a fixed star, a permanent reference point in all our meanderings.

Absolute orientation remains constant no matter where we are. If there is a whole-outside-which-there-is-nothing, there is a possible mental map on which we are always related to that whole. Local maps, on the other hand, assign us changing positions relative to changing reference points. In one sense, "to know the meaning of existence" is to enjoy absolute orientation, to know one's way about the map of the absolute. If disorientation is disturbing, relative orientation in relation to shifting reference points relieves the disturbance only in part. Only absolute as well as relative orientation can relieve it fully.

VIII. *Materialism*

Pantheism, theism, and panentheism are the principal theologies. Materialism, idealism, and mind/matter dualism are the chief cosmologies. Materialism makes all substantial space-time individuals purely physical. Panentheism with a materialistic cosmology would specify God to be the aggregate of merely material things. But panentheism is more frequently combined with an idealistic cosmology of souls (minds).

These two sorts of panentheism are distinguished by their materialist and idealist cosmologies. "Materialism" is understood here as a *cosmology* of the space-time world, not as an *ontology* of all that is. As an ontology materialism implies an atheistic denial of the Creator God, who is pure spirit. Everything is physical. Materialism as a cosmology, on the other hand, allows the existence of God as distinct from any material entity in the world.

Materialism, whether cosmological or ontological, reduces things in space and time at one level of organization to things in interaction on the next lower level, all the way down to the lowest level of elementary particles. Societies are explained as organisms in interaction, an organism is reducible to cells in interaction, cells are reducible to molecules, to atoms, and ultimately to elementary particles in interaction.

Thus social and biological sciences are branches of physics. If we cannot fully comprehend sociological phenomena today, more progress is needed in physics. If we knew all the laws of interaction between physical particles, we could explain great social movements of history. Materialism is not implied by physics itself. But it is the cosmology of an *ambitious* physicist. It is the ontology of an even more ambitious physicist. This is the physicist who holds that within the space-time order physics is potentially all-explanatory. The goal of all science is the completion of physics.

The original materialists predated modern physics. They were arm-chair philosophers who came to the atomistic view of the universe by reflecting on everyday phenomena. The Roman philosopher Lucretius (99-55 B.C.) illustrates this early materialism. As can be seen from the passage below, his materialism is atheistic and ontological rather than cosmological. Everything that is, is merely physical in space and time. Characteristically, it denies the existence of any sense qualities (e.g., pain) not reducible to physical events or behavior:

First then, if things were made out of nothing, any species could spring from any source and nothing would require a seed.... Actually, since each is formed out of specific seeds, it is born and emerges into the sunlit world only from a place where there exists the right material, the right kind of atoms.... nature resolves everything into its component atoms and never reduces anything to nothing. If anything were perishable in all its parts, anything might perish all of a sudden and vanish from sight....

In actual fact, since everything is composed of indestructible seeds, nature obviously does not allow anything to perish till it has encountered a force that shatters it with a blow or creeps into chinks and unknits it.... Consider, therefore, this further evidence of bodies whose existence you must acknowledge though they cannot be seen. First, wind, when its force is roused, whips up waves, founders tall ships.... Here is then proof... that winds have invisible bodies, since in their actions and behavior they are found to rival great rivers, whose bodies are plain to see. Then, again, we smell the various scents of things though we never see them approaching our nostrils. Similarly, heat and color cannot be detected by our eyes, and we do not see sound. Yet all these must be composed of bodies, since they are able to impinge on our senses. For nothing can touch or be touched except body. Again, clothes hung out on a surf-beaten shore grow moist. Spread in the sun they grow dry. But we do not see how the moisture has soaked into them, nor again how it has been dispelled by the heat. It follows that moisture is split up into minute parts which the eye cannot possibly see....

We see the cobble-stones of the highway worn by the feet of many wayfarers.... But to perceive what particles drop off at any particular time is a power grudged to us by our ungenerous sense of sight.... Material objects are of two kinds, atoms and compounds of atoms. The atoms themselves... are preserved by their absolute solidity.... we have found that nature is twofold, consisting of two totally different things, matter and the [empty] SPACE in which things happen.... where there is empty space..., there matter is not; where matter exists, there cannot be a vacuum....

The same reasoning proves that mind and spirit are both composed of matter. We see them propelling the limbs, rousing the body from sleep, changing the expression of the face...--activities that all clearly involve touch, as touch in turns involves matter.... Again, we often see a man pass away little by little, and lose his vital sensibility limb by limb.... Since the vital spirit is thus dispersed [in space] and does not come out all at once in its entirety, it must be regarded as mortal.... If our mind were indeed immortal, it would not complain of extinction in the hour of death, but would feel rather that it was escaping from confinement and sloughing off its garment like a snake. (Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 30-121)

A first objection to materialism is that it denies the obvious. It denies that we experience sense qualities such as pain which are both non-eliminable and irreducible to what is merely physical. We feel sorry for another, not because of the other person's bodily behavior or physiology, but because of his or her pain. "Pain" here is understood in a sense in which it would never occur in a textbook of pure physical science.

A second objection is that matter is defined by energy. Energy is a capacity, which cannot be discovered by direct inspection of the thing. Such a capacity, illustrated by the brittleness of a vase, is discovered only indirectly. It is discovered by experimental interaction with the thing, or by interaction between the thing and another thing. But what exhibits a property only by going through interaction must be capable of "accidental change." It has one state now, and lacks that state later. If the notion of

accidental change is incoherent as argued in Chapter Seven, nothing can be, or be known to be, physical. (This argues against mind-matter dualism too, which holds that the space-time order in part consists in material bodies.)

IX. *Panpsychism*

Materialism is not the only cosmology capable of specifying the nature of a panentheistic God. The commonsense dualist cosmology of things and persons is also a possibility. The cosmology of idealism, asserting that everything throughout space and time is outwardly physical but mental in its inner essence, defines still another type of panentheism.

Panentheists in theology have often been idealists in cosmology. They have been "panpsychists," interpreting nature as the external appearance of souls, or at least mental events with a non-physical activity of sensation and feeling. Panpsychist panentheism allows for a cosmic community, with universal participation *in* and yet distinction *from* the divine. It does not hold that you are the cosmic spirit, but that you are *in* it.

The remainder of this chapter will develop heuristically a case for a panpsychist cosmology. The purpose is not so much to be fully convincing as to liberate our minds from the dogmatism of commonsense, opening them to one way in which the world might prove to be quite different from what we have always assumed. Since our commonsense cosmology today is strongly dualistic panpsychism is a good example of the revisionary metaphysics discussed earlier in the chapter.

The arguments for panpsychism below are found in C. Butler, "The Mind-Body Problem: A Non-Materialistic Identity Thesis" (*Idealistic Studies*, September 1972) and "Panpsychism: A Reconstruction of the Genetic Argument" (*Idealistic Studies*, 1978), and T.L.S. Sprigge *The Vindication of Absolute Idealism*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983. xiv + 291 pp and

A version of panpsychism, "primitive animism," has been identified earlier in this chapter as the first commonsense cosmology of mankind. Modern panpsychism is a more coherent version of primitive animism, backed up by philosophical argument. *Animism* paradoxically attributes the *animation of soul life* even to what is called *inanimate matter*. *Panpsychism*, more coherent, takes life to be a special form of soul in general, which exists throughout the cosmos, even in inanimate matter. But from an ecological viewpoint it is attractive to some as an antidote to the mind-matter dualism of modern tool-using society, which reduces the world to an alien obstacle course to be overcome. It is interesting to see how widespread mind-matter dualism is. Try asking your friends to catalogue what exists. Do they think that purely material things exist, such as perhaps stones or metal? Do they also think that minds exist as irreducible to and separable from bodies, even from brains? If so, they are then mind-matter dualists in the tradition of Rene Descartes. (Descartes' position must not be confused with Strawson's. The latter holds that persons have physical as well as mental states.)

1. We now conclude this introduction to philosophy with two heuristic arguments for panpsychism. We have saved what is probably the most difficult for the end, but we shall try all the harder to state it clearly. The first argument is based on consideration of the mind-brain relation. It may be called the *argument from mind-brain identity*. It claims that panpsychism is preferable on the

basis of its greater simplicity.

Clark Kent and Superman are *identical*, though they are referred to under *different descriptions*. So it may be argued that your mind is your brain as it experiences itself from the inside, while your brain is your mind as observed from the outside. Your mind and your brain are the same thing, in the same place. But they are referred to under different descriptions, viewed from different points of view. Your brain is your mind under an external physical description. Your mind is your brain under an internal mental description.

Physicists hold that energy is the *essence* of all material things. But energy is a tendency (*dispositional property*). It is a body's tendency to alter the state of motion of other bodies. But what has a tendency can pass through different states. It can have different sets of properties at different times. Its capacity is now unactualized, now actualized. Yet, we argued in Chapter Three, a thing is what it is through its properties. Through all of them, not just some. If "*identity*" is understood as *indiscernibility*, it implies the *non-identity of discernible entities*. This in turn implies that an entity which does not realize a potential cannot be identical with one which realizes it. A tendency like energy cannot be the essence of anything which is indiscernibly self-identical. For if it were its essence, realization of the tendency would bring about a difference or discernible change in what was supposed to be indiscernibly self-identical. On the other hand, a momentary actually occurring state of mind (e.g., happiness, an act of sensory perception or mental insight) may qualify as the inner nature of an area of the brain. For it does not imply different "accidental" states in the career of what has an essence limited to only some of its properties, chosen from an external point of view on non-theoretic practical grounds from among all its properties.

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the properties of certain events in your brain are all mental. The question then arises as to the nature of events internal to things other than your brain. Two responses arise. *Either* the inner essence of a physical particle is of some unknown nature X, *or* the inner nature of the particle is mental (at least at some primitive level of development). Assuming your brain to be mental, the first alternative is *dualistic*: it divides the world into two types of reality. There are human brains, which are inwardly mental, and there is inanimate matter, whose inner reality is of some unknown nature X. The disadvantage of this non-panpsychist hypothesis of X, however, is this: it is (a) simpler and (b) empirically non-refutable to take the panpsychist view that the inner nature of all matter is, like that of your brain, to be mental.

Panpsychism cannot be empirically refuted by direct observation of the inner nature of inanimate matter. For we can observe a physical particle only from an external point of view. This prevents us from knowing by direct observation what its inner nature apart from us as external observers is. A thing's *inner nature* may be defined as the properties it has (e.g., seeing a pink elephant, whether hallucinatory or not) not assuming a second essentially independent thing or external observer. A thing's *external nature*, by contrast, consists in properties (e.g., position, mass) which the thing has only assuming external things or observers coexisting with it in an aggregate. A thing's subjective external (accidental) nature depends on variable practical interests (e.g., the wish to sell a suddenly dented table--cf. Chapter Three). The external or accidental nature which we now define is objective. Knowledge of it serves to position things on a map of independent things.

When a theory is not empirically refutable and is simpler than an alternative theory, a *principle of economy* says it should be preferred. This principle says: do not multiply beings or kinds of being beyond what is necessary to account for what is directly observed. That is why a conspiracy theory of the Kennedy assassination is less attractive than a lone assassin theory, assuming they both account for the facts. Dualism multiplies types of reality beyond necessity; panpsychism does not.

From *introspective knowledge* of our own minds, we know that at least one type of reality exists, namely, the mental type. For the human mind (or successive momentary fields of consciousness) has attributes which are not those of matter. *Material attributes* are defined by physics texts: mass, velocity, location, force, momentum, acceleration, etc. The very different sorts of properties noted in the field of consciousness by introspection (*mental attributes*) include: happiness and sadness, pain, sound, and immediate sense qualities. Whereas mass, force, and velocity are *experimentally discovered properties*, the above mental properties appear to be *discovered by immediate inspection*. If matter is what has merely physical attributes, introspection seems to show that materialism is false, that there are some non physical substances with mental properties.

The human *mind* itself has an intimate relation to one body, namely the *brain*. The mind appears to occupy the same place as a portion of the brain. Moreover, there are *laws of correspondence* between mental states and brain states. Taking a drug such as aspirin, for example, causes a chemical change in the brain which is accompanied by changes in immediate sensory experience. One explanation for such correspondences would be that your mind and your brain are the same. When there is too much correspondence between two essay test answers to be dismissed as coincidence we may suspect that the two test authors are one and the same. So the fact that mental states of specific descriptions march together with brain states of specific descriptions may be explained by supposing that they are states of the same thing.

Panpsychism generalizes mind/brain identity to the entire universe as soul/matter identity. "Soul" calls to mind feeling, but not necessarily the intellect associated with the specialized soul called a "mind." Panpsychism is justified only if it can account for all observed facts. But we cannot directly experience what a physical particle is in itself; we cannot directly inspect whatever nature it has apart from its externally (experimentally) discovered physical properties. You are acquainted only with your own mind directly and so-to-speak "from the inside." Excluding consideration of telepathy, no observations verifying or falsifying panpsychist interpretations of inanimate matter are possible. This does not prove panpsychism. But it may be a reasonable hypothesis if it is empirically confirmed in its application to our brains and theoretically simpler in its empirically unconfirmable application to inanimate matter.

One problem which most students quickly point out with this argument is this: if your mind is identical with a portion of your brain, that portion cannot be plausibly identified with a *single* elementary particle or even brain cell. It is presumably identical with a large mass of brain cells. But this makes us wonder how an elementary physical particle can--as panpsychism argues--itself be an elementary soul or mind. Either a brain mass is a single mind or it is an aggregate of independent minds. But it cannot be both at the same time. A solution to this problem may begin with the distinction between a dead or decomposed brain and a live one. Let us assume that a dead brain is but an aggregate of low-level minds (souls, individual centers of feeling). In a live brain mass, independent minds are merged into a

single high-level mind. The merger of low-level minds, as they attain a threshold level of organized interaction (e.g., in coming out of a coma or dreamless sleep), is perhaps the emergence of a high-level mind.

2. The second argument for panpsychism may be called the *evolutionary argument*. It will not be accepted by everyone, since not everyone accepts the theory of evolution. The argument is that if biological evolution of the species is accepted, there is no reason to deny mental evolution as well. Further, if mental evolution in general is accepted, it will be argued that there is no good reason to deny that it starts on the pre-biological level of inanimate matter.

Let us first suppose that evolution--as contrasted to degeneration, decomposition or "devolution"--proceeds from the simple to the complex. *Complex mentality* evolves from *simple mentality* (and ultimately from the simplest possible mentality), just as complex physiology evolves from simple physiology. The multi-celled organism proceeds from the single-celled organism. It will then be argued that the *simplest conceivable biological mentality*--that of a one-celled organism--contains a differentiation of *pain* (sensation of stress) and *well-being* corresponding to the physiological difference between *stimulus* and *response*. The stimulus-response distinction exists on the biological level. The physical stimulus is more or less pain-provoking, while the biological function of the response is to eliminate the pain-provoking stimulus and restore the sense of well-being. Think, for example, of blinking in response to a sudden flash of light.

Now if all biological mentality distinguishes stimulus and response, the *simplest conceivable biological mentality* is not the starting point for mental evolution. The simplest conceivable mentality must be pre-biological--an unconscious sense of well-being which is either uninterrupted by pain, or is interrupted irreversibly (i.e., without any adaptive response, by the thing's ceasing to exist). Such *pre-biological mentality of inanimate matter* is presupposed by the biological evolution of higher mentality.

The complex and more highly organized organism evolves from the simpler type. Speaking of mental as well as physiological evolution, we say that the human mind, the most complex mind known to us, has evolved from simpler forms of mentality. Secondly, if these simpler forms themselves have any complexity, they have evolved from forms even simpler than they, and ultimately from the simplest possible mentality.

But what would the simplest possible mentality be? Far simpler than human mentality, it would lack higher intellectual functions. Further, its sensation would not be differentiated into distinct *modes of sensation* (e.g., touch, taste, or sight). A mind of a one-celled organism could not have different modes of sensation, since it lacks the corresponding necessary organs.

One may wonder whether a one-celled organism can have any mind at all, and if so, what it is like. One behavior in common to us and the amoeba, we have suggested, is *stimulus-response* behavior. When oil is applied to the amoeba it withdraws. In the human case, stimulus-response behavior is explained by a mental event of experienced pain (or at least tension) between the physical stimulus and the physical response. The photon stimulus causes you visual pain, and the visual pain causes your eyes to blink.

Using the principle of economy again, it is difficult to justify any radical break in evolution with regard to something as essential to life itself as stimulus-response. Conceivably stimulus-response in an amoeba, unlike the human case, is a mechanism devoid of sensation. Dualistic world views suggest so. Yet in the human case we know that sensation stands between **S** and **R**. In the amoeba's case we have no direct knowledge of what stands between. We thus have no knowledge of any fact to the contrary of panpsychism.

Secondly, if we are genealogically related to the amoeba on the same evolutionary tree, there is reason to suppose that explanations which apply to humans apply to the amoeba--insofar as differences between human and amoeba physiology permit this supposition. But general and diffuse sensation (e.g., the sensation of stress or of well-being) may occur without *specialized sense organs*. In that case comparative physiology allows for amoeba sensation, with a *generalized organ of sensation* in the whole organism. Sense organs are needed for the specialization of the sensory function, not for its bare presence.

Interpreting stimulus-response in the one-celled organism on analogy with human blinking, we conclude that the one-celled organism has mental experience, too. Its mental life may alternate between a non-specialized sensation of well-being and an equally non-specialized sensation of pain. But this alternation still contains a degree of complexity: it is not the simplest conceivable form of mentality. However, any simpler mentality is pre-biological. It is the pre-biological mentality of purely inanimate matter. The simplest form of such mentality may be a sensation of pure uninterrupted unconscious well-being. This may be the mentality of an indestructible particle, such as a photon (or in a Buddhist vein, an unending series of photonic events). If so, it is the true pre-biological starting point of mental evolution. And this argues for panpsychism, which attributes mental properties to inanimate matter.

Summary Review

This chapter has examined the general idea of religion to determine in what sense pre-historical "religion" is religion. Pre-historical religion prior to the patriarchal revolution was interpreted as based on a panpsychist form of pantheistic theology. This theology in its earliest form contains no recollection of a divorce between humans and nature.

The Main Heuristic Thesis of Chapter Two:

"Primitive animism," the cosmology of pre-historical humanity, is largely true. It holds that all nature is pervaded by souls or spirits. It can be defended by first showing that the human mind is expressed materially in the human brain. Either humans radically diverge from the rest of nature, which expresses an inner nature quite mysterious to us, or the inner essence of everything material is mind or soul on some level of development. The theory of evolution holds that more highly organized physiology evolved from less organized physiology. More complicated mentality then evolves from simpler mentality. Even the simplest *biological* mentality distinguishes pain and well-being. An organism shows stimulus-response behavior. Pain links stimulus and response. Response reduces pain and restores the sense of well-being. The simplest starting point for mental evolution is a sensation of well-being uninterrupted by pain. Such mentality is a *pre-biological* mentality of inanimate matter.