

Chapter Thirteen

ON THE AMERICAN COUNTERCULTURE: THE HEGELIAN METHOD IN POST-HEGELIAN USE

The two previous chapters have considered Hegel's use of the dialectical method in elaborating his own system of philosophy. But if the dialectical method is not available to us to do anything different from what Hegel did—not just to retrace his steps, not just to replicate or falsify his results, but to obtain results dependent on our historical situation that he could never have obtained—it is not a scientific method. While concluding chapters examine non-Hegelian dialectical methods, this chapter examines fruitfulness of the Hegelian dialectical method in the human sciences. It is a method for obtaining an objectively correct (though incomplete) interpretation of the speech and actions expressing an ideal typical standpoint common to a present or past time. When the available texts and behavior are correctly interpreted, the ideal typical standpoint they express is correctly understood. The present standpoint is dialectically comprehended by being derived logically, dialectically, from prior ideal typical standpoints. The standpoints are reproduced or reconstructed in the experience of the interpreter who understands them. The dialectical is a method of formulating and testing empathetic hypotheses about ideal typical standpoints in the dialectical past of a present standpoint. The method of testing is by risking prediction of the sort of further textual or behavioral evidence that will be found.

This chapter is a case study in application of the dialectical method for a purpose other than retracing Hegel's own steps in using the method. The chapter starts out with a twentieth century dialectic that is conjectured to be that of a dialectic recorded in the *Phenomenology*, but then identifies behavioral and textual expressions of that standpoint that falsify the empathetic hypothesis. The chapter concludes by proposing a substitute hypothesis.

The twentieth century dialectic that is reconstructed, first falsely and then in more nearly correct fashion, is that of the so-called American counterculture of the 1960s and early 70s, from the New Left through the hippies, revolutionaries and Jesus people, to the counterculture's collapse in artistry and the cynicism of Watergate. I initially view the development as a reenactment of the very similar dialectic of "active reason"—in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, from the critique of "observation" to "society as a community of animals."

Yet we must reject the possibility of exact reenactment of individual experience, as contrasted to ideal typical reconstruction of it. Perfect re-enactment would be distinguishable from the original enactment. History, Hegel believed, is the enactment of unprecedented novelty and does not fall into eternal returns like nature. I conclude that the counterculture, unlike the dialectic of active reason, was an historical, public dialectic. It was the dialectic of America's discovery of its own specific concept of a rational state. In the American version, that rational state regulates technocracy, a would-be sovereign will to apply science.

Yet, in an age of technological globalism and global insecurity, this discovery came too late. The technological and military basis of the only world-history that Hegel knew, the history of territorially limited states from China to the modern rational state, is disappearing. As a consequence, reconstruction of the countercultural dialectic of the American rational state can no longer reconstruct or dialectically vindicate

the present standpoint of the United States, which is in radical flux. A dialectical reconstruction of *pax Americana* is as impossible for us as a dialectical reconstruction of the Napoleonic Empire was for Hegel in the *Phenomenology*. Hegel's inordinate private interest in this empire at the time of the time of the publication of the *Phenomenology*, as shown by his letters, could gain no scientific expression. The limits of historical construction are also limits of dialectical reconstruction.

Since history is the unfolding of unique and unrepeatable events, any post-Hegelian reenactment of a dialectic that has already appeared Hegel's past can only be inexact. When we practice the dialectical method today, abandoning ourselves to the life of an historical movement whose dialectic we methodologically reconstruct and view, we must do so without furtive side-glances to Hegelian texts. Yet, at the same time, it may be possible to find in Hegel's texts *ideal typical* dialectical progressions that are repeated in general though never in particular.

To us the "counterculture" seems ancient history, and yet it has marked not only a generation, but the character of the United States since. If I link it to Hegel, it is partly to see to how an Hegelian reconstruction of the counterculture might illuminate Hegel and the counterculture, each by the other. Yet given the contemporary context in which I have placed the counterculture, I want to say something about the scope and limits of a dialectical understanding of the United States. The counterculture is a possible test of how Hegel's writings might contribute to the comprehension of our own age (and not merely Hegel's) in thought.

I shall preface my analysis by calling attention to the all-too-neglected convergence of belief between Hegel and Freud.¹ Both take what we may call "the dialectic of revolution and restoration" to be an essential key to the drama of human history. This is a dialectic by which the reflective abstraction and term absolutization of something contained in a pre-reflective immediate context—in negation of the thing's correlates in that context—ends by restoring the thing in the context on a post-reflective level. Every dialectic as Hegel conceives it is a dialectic of revolution and restoration. Term or property abstraction and absolutization always revolts against the concrete truth of internal relationships between terms and properties. And in negation of the negation this revolt always confesses its incoherence and concurs with the thing's now explicit contextual redefinition.

This dialectical pattern is the driving force behind all developments in the *Phenomenology*.² If some section does not seem to show this dialectic, it occurs in a larger context that does show it. Yet the "dialectic of revolution and restoration" need not imply a conservative bias in dialectical developments or in the dialectical method, as if every dialectic ended in the vindication of everything present if the present is concretely understood. For the standpoint of the present is not always one of negation of the negation. It may be one of false term or property absolutization, and false theological absolutization. The "established disorder" may be an institutionally presupposed false dialectical assumption by indirect proof. In that case, the dialectic of revolution and restoration has come to be stuck at some kind of false absolutization, and the negation of that absolutization by the other which it has negated still struggles to disestablish the disorder. In this situation the dialectical method in no way promotes reconciliation with the existing false absolutization, or a restoration of the false absolutization if its self-negation has disestablished it. False absolutization of every type is revolutionary in revolting against a lived experience of the organic unity of terms and of characteristics, and by negating the organic unity the absolutization, digging its own grave, is instrumental in

restoring that unity. What is called “revolution” is often really the restoration of a unity disturbed the understanding (*Verstand*).

We will be chiefly concerned with how the dialectical pattern is played out in the historical sections of text. Reflecting on the *Phenomenology*, we see this dialectic enacted on three different levels. First, it is apparent in the dialectic of self-consciousness, of lordship and bondage. In this dialectic, the slave revolts against the master, only to restore the authority of the master through identification and internalization. He revolts against his chains, only to reproduce them internally through free, uncoerced choice. Thus in the unhappy consciousness which results from the dialectic of lordship and bondage, the master-slave relation is reproduced within individual consciousness. As Jean Hyppolite remarks in commenting on this section of the *Phenomenology*, the master becomes the superego.³ The master-slave dialectic is a particularization of the dialectical pattern of revolution and restoration. Yet the internal restored master is not exactly the same as the original external master. The restored Bourbons were, precisely as restored, not the original Bourbons.

We meet a second particularization of the same dialectical pattern in the dialectic of observation and active-reason, of subjective theoretical and practical spirit. Finally, the same pattern occurs on a still higher level in the dialectic of objective spirit. The evolution of collective history repeats that of the individual from rebellion to adjustment and identification with authority.⁴

A case for viewing the counterculture as a reenactment of the dialectic of active reason in the *Phenomenology*, at least in its logical core if not in all particulars, may be pedagogically helpful by making Hegel relevant to recent history. A kind of breakthrough occurs as the student sees the dialectic at work around her, and not merely in a dusty past. Yet the case we construct might have interest beyond Hegel studies if it actually shed light on recent history and, at the same time, tests the limits of nineteenth century Hegelianism in the twentieth century.

To understand the counterculture one must of course first understand the dominant later twentieth century American culture to which it is opposed. With this in mind I want first to say something about the concept of a technocratic society. I shall define technocracy as a society control by problem-solving experts trained in scientific rationality. A technocratic society is one controlled by technocrats, by those whose scientific training orients them toward the rational solution of problems. Wherever a technocrat sees an unsatisfied need, he or she perceives a problem to be attacked technologically. More ominously in the eyes of some, technocrats tend by their training to posit the need to solve any problem which presents itself as susceptible to technological solution, so that scientific problem-solving by stretching the limits the technology and demonstrating more deeply what we are capable of, tends to become an end in itself. The current frenzy surrounding the application of technology in the classroom in the United States illustrates such a technocratic trend. Classes can be taught with Powerpoint presentations and forums on the Web, so they should be taught this way.

Hegel’s conceptual system is most fundamentally an adaptation of the Aristotelean system in which self-actualization replaces Aristotle’s actualization an other which is already in act because self and other turn out to be inseparable. The dominance of the understanding allows Aristotle to separate self and other, to suppose that an action on the self by its world is an action by an irreducible other. Hegel takes the other to be none other than the more concrete completion of the self. Essence, being in self, is potentiality.

What we are in ourselves, by our *being in self* [*an sich*] or essence, is what we are potentially as demonstrated by our *being for the other* [*für anderes*], i.e., by interaction with our world that alone can actualize potentiality, and by our *being in and for ourselves* [*an und für sich*] in finding ourselves, our potentiality, actualized in this world and thus in finding ourselves in the world.

In a technocratic society human beings inhabit a world of scientifically designed equipment which actualizes an ever increasing range of human potential, and since human beings are who they are only through this world which they have fashioned the current range of human potential is self-actualized in being actualized by that world. A technocratic society does not consider that human beings contain in themselves potentialities that are not self-actualized by the technologically fashioned world. Nor does it consider that the technological actualization of potentials may frustrate the non-technological actualization of other potentials. The teacher who teaches by Powerpoint and the Web is self-actualized in one range of his or her pedagogical potentials, but the potential for saying something new whose content changes lives is ignored by the technocratic stress on technologically sophisticated delivery. The time, expertise, and seduction of the polished presentation may so distract a young teacher from the transformation content that a teacher's potential for unsettling students with new ideas may be left unactualized.

The once technologically insuperable problem of teaching a class with a thousand slides organized in sequence can be solved by new technology, therefore ought to be solved, and in fact has now been solved. Teachers who never consciously wanted to teach a class with a thousand slides are now rewarded by university administrations for wanting to do what has become possible. A thousand slides in a semester an easily understood, quantifiable measure of pedagogical achievement. Students, seduced by the polish, rarely realize what is missing when the time required to make a thousand slides, though far less than before, does not permit concentrated intelligent effort to transform established course content in a way that brings students to the forefront of a discipline. Even administrations, even departmental colleagues with their different specializations, rarely know whether this kind of effort has been made. The prudent young teacher is better advised to aim for quantifiable the results rewarded by technocratic society.

There are of course different kinds and degrees of technocracy: capitalistic, socialist, and what I shall call "absolute technocracy." In capitalistic technocracy, the *means* of economic production are controlled by technocratic managers, but the *ends* of production are determined by the requirements of a return on investment, by the owners of capital. Engineers, those responsible for research and development, do not enjoy complete control. Although their expertise gives them control of the means of production. Private owners determine the problem to be solved, while the technocratic personnel merely determine the condition of its solution.

At least in principle, technocrats do not determine the ends of production in socialist technocracy either. The ends are determined by the purported exigencies of social justice, whether those exigencies are decided by democratic elections or by non-elected elite.

In absolute technocracy, experts determine *both* the ends *and* the means of production. The technocrat ceases to be a mere hired hand and becomes the principal director of social development. And what ends would he be likely to choose? If a technocrat is allowed to determine the ends of production *as a technocrat*, he or she is attracted, I have suggested, by the view that a problem ought to be solved simply because there exists the technical possibility of a solution. The result is what some might call

technology gone wild, applied for the pure professional joy of its application, with regard to neither profit nor considerations of social justice.

In trying to position the United States relative to these three types of technocracy it is necessary to remember that reality is never as simple as an abstract model, that it usually displays contradictory tendencies. All the same, there are certain observations capable of indicating a dominant tendency. First, the United States does not seem to be, at least at present, an absolute technocracy. If it were such a technocracy, it would probably have chosen to construct a supersonic transport or go to Mars by a fixed date. These are problems open to precise, mathematically elegant solution, the kind that technocrats like. But there are doubts as to whether such schemes are either economic or humanly urgent. The fact that America has rejected them signals its refusal before the specter of absolute technocracy, even though economic growth is driven in unforeseen ways by technological innovation pursued for its own sake, by the creation among consumers an economic demand for offshoots of any technology.

Nevertheless, absolute technocracy became a powerful trend during in the 1960's, in part due to the impetus that Sputnik had given to science education in the United States. Many would see evidence of this trend in the Moon program, as well as in national defense projects that proliferate chiefly because the technology is available, although nationalism and national security also play a role. From the perspective of the early twenty-first century, the technological advance that the United States enjoys in defense has placed it in a world of its own to such a degree that joint military operations and with its NATO allies become difficult and sometimes impossible.

The idea of a defense missile system started out in the 1980's as science fiction only to become, gradually, technologically possible and, to this extent, politically mandatory. It is said that such a system should be implemented not because it is technologically possible but because realization of the technological possibility serves national defense. Maybe someday it will serve defense. Today nobody knows for sure, and in the meantime research seeks to establish its technological possibility as a fact. But it seems already decided that any technological possibility of a missile defense ought to be realized, regardless of whether it is the best avenue to true national security given all the other demands on the national budget. Such an assumption bears the mark of absolute technocracy. A missile defense may never be cost effective in generating profitable spin-offs in the consumer economy, it may make no detectable contribution to social justice in the United States, and it may not contribute to national security as much as an equivalent amount of money invested in development aid in the poorest regions of the world. But pursuit of a missile defense system is part of America's struggle to conquer a technological New Frontier.

The power of absolute technocracy, then, should not be underestimated in the United States. But how does America stand in relation to the remaining two models: capitalistic and socialist? It is usually said that the United States has a mixed economy, though since the 1970's the tax-supported social safety net has increasingly been put on a diet. Programs like the war on poverty in the Johnson administration, wage and price controls in the Nixon administration, and CETA ?? during the Carter administration have become unimaginable. National health insurance has been soundly rejected, and in many cities individuals who depend on public transportation are not made to feel like first-class citizens. Programs that are in principle socialist still exist in the United States as in Europe along side capitalism. Yet the proportion of the ones to

the others is a reversal of the proportion that has prevailed in European social democracies—though globalization is leading to the privatization of large public corporations in Europe.

Governmental assumption of control over Amtrak's passenger train service is also indicative. A socialistic pattern is exemplified: a need for passenger service, left unsatisfied by the private railroads, was alleged by the government. Government acted to satisfy the need by the introduction of new technology, such as high-speed trains. Sometimes, especially in the area of defense or alternative energy sources such as hydrogen-powered automobiles, the new technology is so expensive and so laden with financial risk in the free market that only government can offer provide the information, the national policy orientation, financial incentives, and guaranteed market justify its application.

Most important in the long run, as an indicator of the socialistic trend of technocracy in the United States, is the government's commitment, at least in principle, to ecological concerns, to pollution control, to energy conservation, to alternatives to fossil fuels, and to clean technology. Technocratic capitalism could turn out to be a victim of its own success. This does not mean that the profit motive will fade away in economic life, but rather that the kind of economic activity that yields a profit is increasingly determined by public planning for the public good. The fantastic growth of production in highly industrialized nations creates such waste and pollution that only national and, increasingly, global planning can offer the hope of a solution and a hope that the poorest regions and population groups could share in sustainable growth before the ecological limits to growth are reached. This was of course the thesis of *The Limits to Growth* published by the Club of Rome in 1972. Thirty years later, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Club of Rome report has proven itself to be the most important economic analysis of the contemporary era. It provides an important point of departure for questioning a basic assumption of *Das Kapital*, which foresaw communism as a realm of endless economic growth, an endless increase in capital and consumer goods. Marx's perspective, which today enjoys wider support among American technocratic capitalists than among French socialists, is not necessarily refuted, but the indirect costs of economic growth were never adequately considered by Marx. It is possible that by paying sufficient attention to them it will become possible to remove the limits to growth without with less danger to the public good.

But perhaps enough has been said to suggest the conclusion that, although American technocracy remains capitalist by tradition, it may still, by pragmatic necessity more than ideological conviction, become, objectively, increasingly socialist despite or rather precisely because of the exuberance of American capitalism. Minimal government at the domestic level becomes neo-isolationism at the global level. The active leadership of the American government in world governance for the welfare of global civil society conflicts with America's disinclination to active leadership in planning the public good of the domestic American society. But in the long run it is probably better that both domestic and global planning and programs be established by anti-socialists, by men and women who can be trusted to have tested the socialistic conjecture in good Popperian fashion by the energetic search of a viable alternative with which to refute it.

The counterculture of the 1960's and early 1970's against the dominant technocratic culture has introduced in some ways a lasting and revolutionary change in American society. In private life it proved to be an enduring the sexual revolution in the name of pleasure and freedom of sexual orientation without guilt. In education it introduced non-professional goals such as the expansion of experience. In economic life, it

raised protection of the environment as a world of individuals and species enjoying being for themselves and not just being for human producers. introduction of the goal of maintaining a way of life rather than maximizing profit, .

The youth rebellion of the 1960s was not a homogeneous movement. I shall give an account of its development that distinguishes four phases: 1. the New Left, 2. hippies, 3. yippies and 4. Jesus People. I have placed these groups in the apparent order of their historical development, which how I shall consider them. It will appear, I believe, that the counterculture has gone through a dialectical development, and that this development is a reenactment of Hegel's dialectic of subjective spirit in the *Phenomenology*, beginning with the critique of *observation* and going all the way to *society as a community of animals*.

The so-called New Left may be considered in retrospect to be the first phase of the counterculture. C.W. Mills, Herbert Marcuse, N.O. Brown, and Paul Goodman and others were active before anyone had heard of hippies 1964-1965.⁵ The initiators of the New Left were chiefly intellectual critics of alienation in modern technocratic society. What is characteristic of the New Left critique, in contrast to the Old Left of the 1930s, is that it was directed against tendencies toward absolute technocracy present in all technological societies, whether Communist or capitalist. Technical control of the means of production becomes control of the ends of production when investors and state social planners are not equally empowered with technical experts to discuss the means. State planners and investors can of course hire new technicians, but that becomes risky, especially if the existing technicians represent a consensus opinion among experts in their field of specialization. Thus investors and state planners remain at the mercy of consensus opinion among technical personnel. They cannot alter this consensus by their own contributions to the discussion, but must wait for expert consensus in a very restricted discussion circle to change unpredictably. For a generation non-experts with their own varying non-expert opinions on the subject waited for the experts to reach a consensus on global warming, and this was at once a long wait to decide what type of private investments should be made and what domestic and international planning should be made. This touches on the most important underlying cause of the current tendency toward absolute technocracy.

The New Left in the middle of the twentieth century in America began from the premise that the proletariat on which the Old Left pinned its hopes was lacking in revolutionary potential. The New Left has thus vacillated between the pessimism of not being able to point to any historical agent of revolution and exaggerated enthusiasm for one or another substitute for the proletariat—the Third world, students, hippies, even technocrats.

The critique of technocracy which was common ground to New Left writers went something like this. Technocratic society alienates the human person from him- or herself because it imposes the absolute prestige of the scientific viewpoint of detached observation. This viewpoint is not restricted to the scientific laboratory or classroom where it belongs. It insinuates itself into ordinary human activities and relationships. The result is a general spread of non-involvement and personal non-commitment (as illustrated in the Playboy philosophy). It must be said that the intimidation of dissent resulting from the McCarthy hearings, the post-Sputnik drive for excellence in scientific education, and the Beatnik stress on detachment (keeping one's cool) combined to reinforce the cult of scientism and the end of ideology in the late 1950s. Clinical observation, technical skill and impersonalism replace commitment in relations

between the sexes. Internalizing the demands which technocracy makes upon one, one's worth, in one's own eyes as well as those of others, becomes chiefly that of one's expertise. One is valued less as a family member or member of one's community, as a citizen, as a person, and more for what one "can do." One even relates to oneself as a detached spectator. Even outside the work environment others expect one to introduce oneself to them by one's professional credentials. One becomes a proverbial organization man, with a gray flannel suit.

This is a caricature of a critique of alienation in technocratic society. The critique is now become commonplace, but it coincides essentially with Hegel's critique of scientific *observation* in the *Phenomenology*. Let us pursue this seeming coincidence a bit. Natural science, for Hegel, is at bottom pursued for the sake of self-realization. In other words, it is pursued for the sake of attaining a being-in-and-for-itself in which the world ceases to be an alien other, in which the other, ceasing to be a realm of alien objectivity, becomes nothing other than one's own self. Through finding rational, intelligible law in the chaos of sensory phenomena, the scientist hopes to find himself therein. The intelligent identify with the intelligible, rational observers looking at nature find that nature looks back at them rationally.

Yet the progress of science itself teaches that science must ultimately fail as a vehicle of self-realization. This failure becomes obvious only with the emergence of psychology, the last of the empirical sciences to arise. Through what today we would illustrate by behaviorism (Hegel's example of the upshot of psychology is phrenology), the scientist discovers the self to be a bone.⁶ What is wrong is the fundamental attitude taken in the natural sciences. Throughout the natural sciences, the basic attempt remains the same. It is to thingify and immobilize the object observed. Life and, more particularly, selfhood, spirit, do not stand up to observation. They are not to be frozen in the observing glance. They are impalpable and can only be grasped by thought. Observation is fixated on an sensory object for itself. Thought interprets the sensory object as a visible expression of the invisible but objective thought content of spirit.

The coincidence of the New Left critique with Hegel's critique of observation becomes clearer if we place observation in its social context. Observation, for Hegel, is a standpoint of individual or subjective spirit, and subjective spirit is always an abstract moment isolated and absolutized apart from objective spirit. Intersubjectively share spirit becomes objective spirit when it is institutionalized, when its presuppositions are those of a stable institution and not merely those of a temporary consensus of public opinion. Public opinion by its does not qualify as objective spirit. A stable phase of objective spirit appears as the institutional generalization throughout society of what initially was a subjective individual standpoint, and of what subsequently became intersubjective through a consensus of opinion. In the light of this, we may ask what form of objective spirit institutionalizes the standpoint of observation. The institutional generalization of the observational standpoint marks the imperial type of state (e.g. Rome) which is the successor of the city-state in the West.

As long as the city-state remains vital, local myths and customs dominate which give the individual a sense of belonging, but which smother individuality and block realization of his or her destiny as a member of a cosmopolis. The standpoint of observation, such as Herodotus assumed in his *Histories* of various non-Greek contemporary cultures, is one which presupposes a degree of detachment from the provincialism of the city-state. The devotee of theoretical reason is a potentially subversive force, a fifth

columnist in the city-state, which is why the intuitions of Socrates= executioners were not have been far from the mark. The scientific observer is acutely aware of the relativity of local beliefs, and does not identify unconditionally with any of them. When the imperial system, combining a variety of ethnic communities into a new society, is finally established, he or she is more comfortable, and rational observation and tolerance make him or her a valuable servant of the new order. Pontius Pilate serves as an example of the type. With neither Christian nor Jewish sympathies, his sole overriding concern was imperial order. The problem of governing a vast imperial society is technocratic, and ethnic prejudice is a fatal flaw in a technocrat. That is what, from European and Arab points of view, has seemed to make most recent American presidents in the imperial presidency bad emperors in conducting Middle Eastern policy. Technocratic observers in an imperial state seek to construct a pantheon drawn from all ethnicities on the model of a zoological garden. The juxtaposition these ethnicities and their respective gods facilities scientific comparison and contrast aimed at reconciling their legitimate claims in a stable imperial order and Roman or American peace.

Now of course the United States is not an imperial state in the exact sense of the Roman Empire. But it does resemble Rome in being a vast, geographically and ethnically diverse society in which the individual risks being uprooted from any city-state or local ethnic origins. Furthermore, the expansion of America's unique role in world security with regional military commands around the world, with an increasing list of client states, is making it increasingly resemble aspects of the Roman Empire. The prestige of the observational perspective affected Rome, not because it was imperialistic but because it was in practice a pluralistic state, and this characteristic it shares with the United States. A pluralistic state is a state which is neither totalitarian and revolutionary nor authoritarian and traditionalistic, but which tolerates competing revolutionary and traditionalist opinions, life styles, and organizations so long as they do not threaten to transform the pluralistic state into a totalitarian or traditionalist state. Finally, America's technological preeminence, along with the capitalistic assimilation of persons to commodities, has served to generalize the observational standpoint of thingification beyond any level known in Roman times.

Pursuing an analysis of the American counterculture, the writers of the New Left offered an intellectual indictment of depersonalization and dehumanization in technocratic society. However, they were frequently neither young nor particularly nonconformist. Several were academics. The second group were the hippies. We cannot assume them to have read academic critiques of absolute technocracy very assiduously, but it nonetheless seems to have gone to work to put the New Left's critical understanding of technocratic society into practice.⁷ The hippies tried to opt out of the technocratic society. They revived a back-to-nature ideal. They sought a simpler, more spontaneous, less regimented, and less intellectual way of life. To the establishment view that life is competition and career struggle, they opposed the subversive view that it is joy. They naturally find their place in the Hegelian dialectic at a stage of hedonistic egotism described in the section of the *Phenomenology* entitled *Pleasure and its Necessity*.⁸ The hippy aversion to work, the cult of spontaneity, the a-sociality of >doing your own thing,= and the socially unrelated pleasure tripping induced by drugs all illustrate what Hegel appears to have in mind.

Of course hippies are not specifically cited by Hegel in the *Phenomenology*, but the standpoint of pleasure and its necessity in the *Phenomenology* is not assumed by Hegel to be a fully determinate standpoint whole concept analytically contains all its particularizations. Rather, like all Hegelian concepts, it

is a determinable concept capable of expressing itself in countless non-deducible and unpredictable determinations. The concept with its essential thought content remains the same as we pass from the text in the *Phenomenology* to the counterculture. Yet the concretely universal concept embracing its particularizations continues to have life only as it expresses itself in ever new particularizations.

In the *Phenomenology* the pleasure pursuits of others and the conditions of civilization, the constraints of rules and regulations that make the private pursuit of pleasure possible, negate private pleasure. Reason responds to this alien otherness or *necessity*, which negates its present incarnation in egoistic hedonism in contradiction to the dialectically preceding standpoint of observation, by reflecting sociality (a dimension of the alien otherness which is confronted) into its goal or standard, which is thus expanded into the standard of realizing pleasure for all. The new standpoint is not a complete collapse of pleasure into necessity, but is an inclusion of the necessity or inescapability of other persons (necessity₁) into the redefined hedonistic standard, the standard of universalistic hedonism. This new standpoint, discussed in the section entitled the *Law of the Heart*, expresses itself in the *Phenomenology* in political romanticism and revolutionary idealism.⁹

The law of the heart is not a Benthamite technocratic universalist hedonism that calls upon legislation and utilitarian experts in the hedonistic calculus to produce the greatest pleasure for the greatest number. It is a much more spontaneous universalism. The system of legislation and rational calculation from the standpoint of detached observation on which Bentham depended is for the law of the heart the enemy of universal pleasure. To implement the universal law of the heart means to create a society in which everyone is free to do what the spirit moves him or her to do. Everyone does what feels good. Constraints designed to produce greater pleasure in the future are ploy to reduce the only pleasure we really know. The pleasure of the now generation is that of the here and now. Future pleasure calculated by technocrats who forgo pleasure themselves for career advancement, and who are fundamentally envious of those who actually have pleasure is at best hypothetical and at worst trickery.

At this point, too, the dialectic of the American counterculture repeats the Hegelian dialectic. A utopian radicalism eventually grew out of the initially a-political hippie movement. >The fun-and-games era did not last long, perhaps only from 1965 to 1966.=¹⁰ >From 1967 onward many hippies renounced non-violence and political indifference.=¹¹ The hippies failed to achieve what they sought. They soon discovered that it was impossible to >drop out= of technocratic society and >do your thing= as if this society did not exist. To suppose that one could is to fall into the error of abstract thinking. In various ways the hippy would fail to escape contact with the society she was rejecting. She would be obliged to find an uninteresting job. Or, if particularly talented, she would end up compromising with the system by commercializing the counterculture, exploiting the popularity of its musical and artistic fads. Or she would be obliged to write home to her parents for money. In one way or another, hippie ended up as parasites on the dominant culture which they sought to reject.

The group that goes beyond the hippies and their romantic egoistic hedonism in the counterculture, a group that expresses Hegel's law of the heart and its romantic universal hedonism, we might stereotype as the >hippies,= although I shall understand by this term a broader group than that properly called by the term. By the term >hippie= I shall refer to a politically radicalized hippie, or alternatively to a hippified political radical.¹² This eventual merger of the New Left, which had gained its original momentum from the

civil rights movement, and the initially independent hippie movement was helped along by the anti-war movement, a political issue with which draftable drop-outs could easily identify. The fusion gave the New Left what seemed to some a potentially revolutionary constituency, a renewed feeling of contact with reality. Many hippies seem to have eventually realized the impossibility of dropping out. And to the extent that they retained the goal of overcoming alienation, they had but one logical choice: revolution aimed at changing the system.

However, genuine social revolution proved impossible. The counterculture remained just that: a counterculture. Representatives of the law of the heart, in a new underground culture, included the pleasure of others in the goal, but hard necessity of petrified institutions (necessity) remained. The young radicals failed to find in American society a sufficient mass base for fomenting real revolution. If they had, what was in fact a phase of subjective spirit, a revolution which went on primarily in the imagination of the radicals, would have been escalated to the level of objective spirit. And in their frustration, some radicals resorted to the irrational and self-destructive violence and terror which appeared at the end of the 1960s.

Many survivors of the counterculture's revolutionary phase recognized the futility of violence and terror, the hopelessness of transforming an unwilling career-oriented majority according to the vision of their paradise. In the 1970's America's romantic cultural revolution fared no better than Mao's cultural revolution. Those who retained their rejection of technocracy became subject to a far-reaching religious revival. I am not suggesting that individual political radicals converted to religion as much as that religiosity replaced revolutionism in the forefront of the youth culture. We shall refer to this fourth group of the counterculture as the "Jesus people."¹³ The paradise of spontaneity and emotional freedom is projected into a sphere beyond existing society, the kingdom of heaven. In part the Jesus movement merely developed the vague religiosity which had been a part of the hippie movement from the beginning. But at the same time the new movement reflected the more general post-revolutionary romantic yearning and nostalgia which swept the country in the early 1970s. This phase of the counterculture should be brought into relation to Hegel's discussion of "Virtue and the Way of the World," which follows the section on the heart and its law.¹⁴

The Jesus movement stood apart from the world, issued sermons to it, holding out the promise of a salvation of which it is already convinced in its own case. The movement tended to be politically conservative: to sermonize to the world is, far more than to foment revolution against it, to recognize its inherent goodness. Only the corrupting principle of selfishness, the vice of living merely for one's own self rather than for the whole world need be abandoned. Since other people are already inherently virtuous, no revolution is necessary for them to manifest virtue. All that was needed is for inner virtue to be manifested outwardly. The faith was that this moral conversion from the selfishness of what the New Testament calls the "the World" to Jesus' ethic of love could be effected without violence and revolution by rhetorical appeals, sermons, the arts, the media, in short, by "the Word". Those who have the power of the Word already live in Christ and thus need no sermons. Their lives are lived out of the virtue of selfless love, and thus they are no longer under the Law.

However, the self-righteous standpoint of virtue preaching the Word is perversely selfish itself, since it affirms the universality of its own personal virtue, a virtue not realized in the world as it outwardly appears. Virtue, given to preaching, would remain apart from the world, but the artistry of the successful

preacher is corrupted by the very egotism that it negates. Preachers, each with his or her unique gifts, compete for a following. These gifts come from God. Yet to each preacher goes the merit of opening himself or herself to divine grace and of having been elected to receive these gifts of the Word and none others.

The next standpoint, discussed by Hegel in the section entitled >Society as a Community of Animals,= negates that negation.¹⁵ It reflects the competitive individualism which according to the previous standpoint perverted the world, but which now in the form of individual self-realization through creative work becomes the new standard. The preacher becomes essentially a calculating artist. What counts for him is not so much the cause for which he speaks as the silver tongue with which he speaks. Generalizing, everyone has his or her own work to do, and jealously guards it from being purloined by others. Followers are welcome, but not competitors who would steal credit. Since everyone rates his or her own work highly, relations with colleague are not always collegial. When there is no fear that the other worker will steal one's ideas, there is fear that the other's ideas may be better. Society as a community of animals is not literal life and death struggle, but it is a life and death struggle for the survival of the careers of some at the expense of the careers of others.

It is possible to see, in the artists who commercialized the Jesus movement in the form of rock opera, as well as in the widespread cynicism surrounding the 1972 presidential elections, evidence of the transition to society as a community of animals. Many noted that in the McGovern-Nixon contest that the energy of moral reform accompanying the election of Kennedy in 1960 had spent itself. Charges of political corruption now fell on deaf ears. It did not at that point really matter how much publicity Watergate received. After all, were not all politicians corrupt? With the arrival of this stage, the counterculture came almost full circle. It collapsed back into the acquisitive, achieving society against which it initially rebelled. The newly emerging society based itself on amoral expertise from the standpoint of objective observation, but it goes beyond the standpoint of observation prior to the counterculture by holding present to mind the dialectic by which such a standpoint has just vindicated itself.

The standpoint of observation in the *Phenomenology* arises from reason seeing itself in all reality, where such universal reason sees itself as the solution to the problem of unhappy consciousness. Theoretical reason is observation knowing the world, while practical reason is the action of making one's world. Theoretical reason transforms concepts to make them conform to reality. Active reason transforms reality to make it conform to concepts. In the *Phenomenology* theoretical reason and hence observation precede active reason. Observation is an immediate but false method of rational self-actualization as unhappy consciousness tries to find itself in a world that it has not made. Pythagoras, the father of natural science and observation, tried to find himself in the lawful proportionalities underlying sensory phenomena. Self-actualization by natural science is like trying to find oneself in a stone, but if we reflect that natural science is itself an historical construction it becomes possible to seek self-actualization by studying natural science rather than nature, the subject of natural science. Pythagoras's thought was, more than natural science, a philosophy of natural science that construes human natural science to be the nature's self-knowledge through human scientists. This philosophy of science clearly goes beyond what Hegel calls observation. Hegel himself, following Vico, would find himself in the constructions of world history (including natural science) which human beings like himself have made. As Vico argued, it is possible to

find yourself fully only in a world that you have made, and this is the justification for rating active reason over theoretical reason.

Theoretical reason, observation, in the above analysis of the counterculture is abstracted, not merely in general from unhappy consciousness attempt to overcome its unhappiness by establishing a rational awareness of being of being one with all reality, but more particularly from scientism in American culture in the 1950s'. Scientific theoretical reason in general expressed itself, in particular, in the American technocratic mystique. The United States won World War II in the Pacific by sparing American lives with a new technological application of theoretical physics. There is no contradiction between the *Phenomenology* and the above analysis of technocratic society in America. As already noted, a general concept is never present merely in general, but always requires some particularization or other that is not deducible from it.

The reconstruction of the counterculture I have given does not imply that there are no longer hippies that hark back to 1965, or radicals who recall 1968. The 1960's continue to serve as models for some. However, just as the survival of an *émigré* aristocrat does not belie the destruction of the *ancien régime*, so the survival of a hippy commune in Colorado or Utah does not disprove the claim that the movement has died as an *avant-garde* movement in the imagination of the general public.

1. The member of technocratic society found his or her pleasure negated by the primacy of observation in such a society. 2. Individual pleasure abstracted and absolutized itself, but by withdrawing from rather than negating technocratic society that negates it. Technocratic society negated individual pleasure merely in itself prior to the counterculture. Technocratic society also negates individual pleasure existing for itself in the first stage of the counterculture, that of the hippies. 3. The cause of pleasure is then taken up by the law of the heart, which integrates both individual pleasure and the universal society as moments of a more comprehensive concept, that of universal pleasure. The cause of universal pleasure cannot withdraw from technocratic society like individual pleasure, and so it would negate it in revolt. Yet, except for a rising ecological consciousness, revolt against the discipline of technocratic society in the name of the universal freedom of spontaneity must fail. 4. The cause of pleasure then assumes the form of virtue: it integrates the goodness of its aspiration to universal pleasure with the matching essential goodness of the technocratic society to be converted. However, the ways of the world in technocratic society resist conversion. These are not so much ways of observation as ways of careerism. 5. Failing to convert, virtue is convert to technocratic society as society as a community of animals: it adopts the opportunism of the world—*jeder hat seine eigene Arbeit*—as its means of maintaining its pursuit of universal pleasure.

The dialectic of the counterculture transforms observation, necessity, technological society in only one essential respect. The standpoint of scientific observation comes to be subordinated to the successful pursuit of financial rewards or reputation. Society is *the other* of pleasure, but pleasure collapses into a seemingly immovable other, without ever seeming to raise itself to a truer concept of pleasure by incorporating its relation to other. Yet pleasure does raise itself to a higher level in the form of pleasure in society as a community of animals, of pleasure of the realization of talents and rivalry. The other is not totally immovable. Professional success now replaces observation as the dominant standpoint in technocratic society. Pure technocratic society gives way to a more entrepreneurial technocracy.

Could the >greening of America= someday occur if forces of production developed to the point of

making a repressive work ethic obsolete? Could the counterculture of some future generation transform the United States into that bastion of flower power for which some hoped? Both Freud and Marx would reject the view that optimally developed productive forces might lead to an unrepressed society.

Communist society was not to be a society of non-repressing, non-sublimating, culturally non-creative, overtly erotic hippies. Too much greenery calls forth a reaction of guilt, a restoration of old gods. Freud and Marx both invoke a Hegelian dialectic of revolution and restoration. They conclude that that history results in an internalization and humanization of once rejected social authority, restoring that external authority by raising it to the level of rational internal authority. Hippies need the system of “necessity” to provide the discipline of the civilized work world that makes a life of dropping out possible. A communist society would no longer need capitalists. Proletarians would internalize the demands that capitalists once made upon them externally. They would place the discipline of labor and self-realization on themselves as a self-chosen task, in society as a community of animals.

Could a counterculture of a future generation create a new balance between work and recreation in harmony with an over-producing society? In the foreseeable future, barring unforeseeable technological breakthroughs, the success of any counterculture similar to that of the 1960s assumes on an affluence which, in a global context, appears illusory. Given large pockets of poverty in the world, production may be excessive but it is more certainly misallocated or wasted. In that case, heavy investments of labor are still necessary to reallocate production, but the reallocation of production is itself a further product. The work ethic is not out of date.

No doubt this analysis of the counterculture is over-simplified, but it may be part of the truth—that it is true as far as it goes. The chronology of the counterculture and its phases clearly suggest that an Hegelian >dialectical history= of this important movement can be written. The essential conditions of such a history, as defined by Christensen,¹⁶ are clearly present: (1) a mass of empirical detail, interconnected causally and chronologically, is available, and (2) the causal chronology indicates that the movement of the period has been dialectically progressive, rather than regressive or repetitive.

At the beginning of this chapter I noted that the Hegelo-Freudian dialectic of revolution and restoration occurs on the levels of both subjective and objective spirit. The countercultural dialectic was historical in intent and in what it accomplished, but it within American society it remained on the level of subjective spirit because it failed to carry American society along with it to a consensus. However, a parallel dialectic worked its way through the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries on the level of objective spirit, in the movement leading up to and beyond the French Revolution. The parallelism is not complete, mainly because the great historical dialectic of objective spirit began with a critique of aristocracy rather than with the paradigm of natural science, but it is still worth noting:

1. The organization man of technocratic society is both similar to and distinct from the courtier of the royal court, whose alienation and self-seeking artificiality and conformism Hegel describes in the *Phenomenology*.
2. To the New Left critics of alienation in technocracy there corresponds the critique of aristocratic morals contained in Enlightenment literature.
3. To the hippy there corresponds the back-to-nature life style more preached than practiced by Rousseau.
4. Correlated with counterculture revolutionaries we have the French Revolution.
5. Linked to the Jesus people, illustrating what Hegel calls *virtue* on the level of subjective spirit, we have what he calls *morality* on the level of objective spirit,

followed by the romantic, nostalgic rebirth of religion in post-revolutionary Europe. 6. To the cynicism about goals of universal welfare in which the counterculture resulted in the end there corresponds the self-seeking of aristocratic reaction and, especially after the July Revolution, abandonment to capitalistic acquisitiveness. From this it would seem that a dialectic which took one hundred fifty years to work itself out on the level of objective spirit is very similar to a dialectic that was repeated on the level of subjective spirit in America in hardly more than ten years.

Let us return once more to the main question raised by the above analysis of the counterculture. A dialectic of revolution and restoration starting with *aristocracy* enacted itself objectively in world history, and re-enacted itself according to the dialectical-hermeneutic method in the sections on 0000000 in the *Phenomenology*. A second dialectic of revolution and restoration in the *Phenomenology*, starting with *observation*, does not transpire on the level of objective spirit at all. Where aristocracy was disempowered by the French revolution and by Hegel's rational state, rational state proceeding from the dialectic of observation and active reason cannot disempower the technocratic class, but can only regular its growing power. Observation for Hegel was not a social class, but a first conjecture as to how to realize reason's project of finding itself in all reality.

My hypothesis will be that what for Hegel was a non-historical dialectic, the dialectic from observation through active reason, became historical in twentieth century American history. For Hegel the rational state was based on the elimination of aristocratic political power. The king would only dot the *i*'s. In America a rational state was based on the regulation (not elimination) of technology, of the application of science, of invention, and entrepreneurship. It means regulation of the technocratic thought that, since it is possible to clone sheep, cats, and human beings, they ought to be cloned. Since it is possible to go to Mars, human beings should go to Mars. Since it is possible to keep individuals alive by extravagant life support systems, they ought to be kept alive in this way. Since a missile defense system it is technically possible, it should be realized. Technocracy is background rule over foreground corporate and governmental budget decision-makers by scientists report writers identified with the realization of technological possibility. The rational state does not eliminate the technocratic tendency, but it prevents it from being sovereign.

Today the American effort to construct a rational state is threatened by the fact that the American technological imagination reached domestic limits and required world markets. The disappearance of the domestic frontier, according to Hegel, would be connected with the emergence of a rational state in the United States. The frontier spelled opportunity, and an ever possible escape to the frontier implied that if one stayed behind one could not complain. The end of the domestic frontier would lead, for Hegel, to the class animosities and conflicts that Europe has known, and would require the rational state for them to be mastered. Yet end of the domestic frontier was also connected with the emergence of the global economy as America's new frontier, the free world as a world free from repression but also free for American economic penetration. This new frontier has thus far not operated as a safety-valve by providing new outbound destinations for immigration like the old frontier. But it has attracted the marketing efforts necessary to amortize the cost of new technology. The purely domestic regulation of technology can no longer be effective. If cloning is declared unethical in the United States, it can be done elsewhere.

The European Union is a world economic power equal to the United States. But it takes only a

stroll through European supermarkets and stores to realize how much European production, especially value added production, is a production of American-invented products by European subsidiaries of American corporations. Similar strolls in stores in the United States tell no similar story about European corporations. The United States' rise to prominence in international politics and economic life during the twentieth century caused a qualitative growth in presidential power, as foreign policy—in which the Constitution and pragmatic necessity protect the prerogatives of the President—gradually eclipsed the importance of domestic policy. The American presidency of recent vintage illustrates Hegel's concept of the chief of state who in domestic affairs ceremoniously officiates and solemnizes the results of institutionalized decision-making but who in foreign policy exercises, in his person, a sovereign power of decision-making.¹⁷ The Nixon administration in particular showed the same vacillation between domestic constitutionalism (law and order) and monarchical absolutism in foreign policy (with the latter sometimes undermining the former) that Hegel was unable to purge from his own description of the chief of state.

There are, of course, apparent differences between Hegel's idea of the state and the United States. The Hegelian state is marked by corporate rather than parliamentary representation. Hegel was suspicious of universal suffrage based merely on one's status as a citizen like all other citizens. He was opposed to mass democracy in which individuals vote as identical atoms with identical rights abstracted from their differing particular domestic and professional rights and responsibilities. He preferred individuals to vote according to their education and interests as members of professional and occupational organizations. The United States has mass-democratic parliamentary institutions, but their operation is sometimes more formal than real. The power of special interests groups, the Washington lobbies, labor organizations, and corporate business makes the difference between Hegel's state and the United States on this score less important than a mere reading of the Constitution might suggest. America's informal constitution is closer to Hegel's rational corporate state than its formal constitution.

The Hegelian state is an hereditary monarchy, while the United States has an elected president. Hegel had fears, born of his observation of the Holy Roman Empire, that an elected chief of state would turn the sovereignty and higher interest of the state into a political football, prey to the demeaning assaults of partisan and sectional interests. Presidential candidates are Eastern establishment or Southern, pro-labor or pro-business, big-government or small-government, isolationist or internationalist, Catholic or Protestant, female or male. Elected presidents are initially held captive to the partisanship of their campaigns. They are elected to use their judgment in the national interest, not to represent unconditionally any sectarian interest, but a new election returns their august office to the arena of partisan debate every four years.

Here, then, is one respect in which the American state apparently fails to actualize the Hegelian idea of the state. The Hegelian chief of state is not elected. But the degree to which American democracy separates the United States from Hegel's idea of a rational state is not as great as might be imagined. The United States is a presidential democracy, not a parliamentary democracy, but presidential democracy is all but a contradiction in terms. When the chief symbol of the nation and chief focus of patriotic allegiance is at once the nation's chief policy-maker, in other words when the chief of state also head the government, citizen dissent becomes unpatriotic. The very possibility of a loyal opposition, the underpinning of democracy understood as governmental answerability to public-minded scrutiny by the associations and

groupings of civil society (i.e. democracy in a sense Hegel approves), is undermined. All opposition becomes disloyal, and all loyalty becomes non-oppositional.

Being a chief of state must, like all abstract universal characteristics according to Hegel, be somehow particularized, but being a true chief of state, one who is true to the concept of a chief of state, is not compatible with all proposed particularizations. It cannot be particularized by *being* a head of government, though the sovereign must, according to the very concept of sovereignty be particularized by *having* a head of government. When someone who functions as a national father figure has the powers of government, in the psychological regression which citizens show in a crisis these powers are quickly assimilated to those of a father over children. Either one says "After all, he is the President," or one is made to feel that one is throwing mud on the flag. Such a response is appropriate in a truly great crisis, but the near religious reverence is paid to a governing chief of state lowers the threshold of a truly great crisis. The determinable reverence due to a national figurehead cannot become determinate in the critical scrutiny due to a nation's chief policy-maker in normal times of deliberate decision making.

When the institutions of a nation push its citizens to combine determinable an abstract universal with an incompatible determinate particularization, a kind of institutionalized objective (i.e., intersubjective) contradiction arises. This is not the contradiction of absolutizing what is abstract and thus relative to that from which it is abstracted. The absolutization of what is abstract is dialectical contradiction, a rationally motivated contradiction which is internal by dialectical logic to the congenial abstractive act of thinking. The term-absolutization of a chief of state in abstraction from any head of government, or of a head of government in abstraction from a chief of state, generates, I shall argue in a moment, true dialectical contradiction. But contradiction between an abstract universal and a falsely alleged particularization is non-dialectical. It is due to a collision between two mutually external abstract universals neither of which successfully subsumes the other as a particularization. Such a collision is willful.

If political thinking has term-abstracted and term-absolutized the chief of state and if (as I shall argue) to be a chief of state is nonetheless to have a head of government, the chief of state will abstract his necessary other, the head of government, only to negate him in order to maintain the term absolutization. But negation of the other is ambiguous. It may mean negation of what the other is, or it may mean negation of only the otherness of the what it is. To negate what the head of government is is to deny that the head of government, the other, is a head of government. His existence as head of government is repressed. But repression can be supported by other defense mechanisms. To negate merely the otherness of the head of government illustrates the mechanism of identification with the aggressor. Any other which (who), in virtue of what (who) it is, contradicts a fixated indirect proof assumption absolutizing some term or property poses as an aggressor. If the chief of state is led by his or her constitution to identify with the aggressor, he or she poses incongruously as head of government. Progress in the dialectic beyond this point requires the return of the aggressor to resolve the incongruity. Denying the otherness of the aggressor the other does not make that otherness go away anymore than repression makes it go away. If identification with the aggressor fails, repression by itself may not be strong enough to prevent conscious negation of the term absolutization by the negated other.

Any governmental policy against an opposition presupposes that neither the government nor the opposition is sovereign. As soon as either side is sovereign, political struggle escapes the area of domestic

politics to become inter-state struggle. Domestic governmental policy becomes foreign policy. Thus a head of government pursuing a divisive policy that creates opposition is relative to a chief of state exercising a unifying function that checks sovereign behavior by either the government or the opposition and subjects both to the internal sovereignty of the state. A chief of state as one term is relative to a head of government as another term. For a sovereign without a head of government is a power of action without action, which is no power at all. The truth of a power is in its exercise. A chief of state implies a head of government *other* than him- or herself. A unifying internal sovereign divides a state into two sovereignties if he or she prosecutes a governmental policy against an opposition. The governmental policy becomes sovereign policy. As a result the opposition, unless it abandons its opposition and thus remains subject to the sovereign's unifying power, escapes subjection to the sovereignty of the state and becomes a foreign power towards which the sovereign's proper response is war.

If this is correct, we must conclude that democracy can be sustained only if the chief of state reigns without governing. This seems the one continuing lesson of the 1960s, from Kennedy to Nixon, from the Bay of Pigs, through Vietnam to Watergate. After the 1960s, the non-activist presidency of Eisenhower, so maligned in the 1950s, could only inspire admiration. (The Nixon presidency of course not a complete repetition of the 50s, but it was a repetition of Nixon.) American presidents alternate between, on the one hand, abuse of their symbolic figurehead role to protect policy and personal initiatives from close scrutiny and, on the other hand, forbearance from aggressive and controversial policy-making initiatives in order to preserve respect for the figurehead. Eisenhower and Gerald Ford and Bush Senior were the other side of the coin from Nixon or Johnson or Clinton.

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, President received sweeping powers from Congress to prosecute a war against terrorism with a free hand, without really having to press his case. In a crisis a nation wants a monarchical figure to act aggressively without the necessity of close public scrutiny. In such times the contradiction inherent in the democratic scrutiny of monarchical policy-making does not arise. For democratic scrutiny is suppressed for reasons other than the sanctity of the presidential office. Cockpit cross examinations of a pilot's decisions by passengers are willingly silenced by the passengers themselves.

A solution of the contradiction inherent in the American presidency would be a move toward separation of the President's conflicting roles through the creation of an office of prime minister alongside the chief of state, according to the European model. A logical extrapolation from the same principle of separation between sovereign state and political government would be the *complete* elimination of the chief of state from politics through the suppression of presidential elections and the establishment of a hereditary monarchy. But the historically based resistances to both proposals are all too evident. At one time there would have been some hesitation in the United States to consider prime-ministerial government because of its instability, as in post-war Italy or France under the Fourth Republic. But the America's two-party system and ideological indifference might save the United States from such factionalism and instability.

In any case, Hegel's own theory of the state is open to the charge of inconsistency in, on the one hand, advocating hereditary monarchy in order to keep the chief of state out of politics and, on the other, tolerating the politicization of the chief of state through his foreign-policy functions. What I take to be the more basic Hegelian ideal of separating the majesty of state from the dissension of politics would seem to

argue for a revision of his position in the *Philosophy of Right* in the direction of ministerial responsibility for foreign affairs. Such ministerial responsibility for German foreign policy leading up to the First World War might have saved the Hohenzollern monarchy and contributed to German political stability in the post-war era.

However, mention has yet to be made of the one all-important fact which increasingly prevents the United States or any other state from truly realizing the Hegelian idea of the state even if it separated scrutinized government from the individual who embodies sovereignty. Autonomous states, Hegel says, are principally wholes whose needs are met within their own borders.¹⁸ We recall that it was the Holy Roman Empire's military impotence in the face of the French revolutionary state which convinced Hegel that Germany was no longer a state. We presently live in a world in which what, in absolute terms, is certainly the most powerful state ever to appear on the face of the earth 1. has been incapable of securing its national defense except on a doctrine of deterrence and balance of terror which was incredible in the long run—especially in view of nuclear proliferation—and 2. is incapable of securing its economic well-being through purely internal measures. Formally speaking, the United States approximates the Hegelian state quite remarkably, but substantially it is likely to do so less and less because, given the economic and military basis of the Hegelian state, the United States came too late. It is not only Germany that is a *verspätete Nation*. Today the state, like the countercultural process of discovering its necessity, is a subjective phenomenon with little an objective basis. We live in the birth throes of a new world-historical age unknown to Hegel. The age of city states and national and imperial states, dating from the oriental despotisms all the way to the modern Germanic states, is receding into the past. The solution to the problem of a technocratic global civil society taxes the capabilities of national parliaments. It requires the construction of institutions of global governance, ideally global federation..

This reference to world federation may appear either utopian or subversive, but in fact it is neither, since it is meant descriptively rather than ideologically. It is not a rhetorical appeal to join a band-wagon of one-worldism. World federation [barring conquest] can only come about as the cumulative effect of the piecemeal creation of international institutions each born of pragmatic necessity rather than any self-conscious ideological movement. As our world becomes increasingly remote from Hegel's we will be increasingly incapable of achieving an comprehension of our own age in thought through the dialectical-hermeneutic method merely by reading the *Philosophy of Right* and studying its doctrine of the territorially limited rational state.

My conclusion is that a dialectical reconstruction of the American counterculture is correct as far as it goes. I have completed my account of a subjective or non-historical dialectic of reason actively realizing itself in the *Phenomenology* by reflections on the state. I have portrayed the dialectic as one of revolution against a dehumanizing state and restoration in a new role of the state as the guarantor of rights. This account makes the dialectic into one of objective spirit, since the state exists on the level of objective spirit and since the dialectic leads from one type of state to another. Hegel says very little about the state in the *Phenomenology*. Yet his omission of the state in the 1807 text did not mean that he was less interested in political life at the time. On the contrary, his letters show that he was intensely interested in Napoleon, and that he believed that the Napoleonic empire was coming to stay. Hegel interpreted partial measures tending to establish such an empire as tips of a complete institutional iceberg that was already virtually

present. Yet the *Phenomenology* is a confession that the institutional whole was still incomplete, and that he could not use the dialectical-hermeneutic method to reconstruct the Napoleonic edifice because that edifice had only begun to construct itself. In Hegel's hands, it is not a method of constructing the future. My introduction of a restored rational state and the end of the dialectic of the counterculture makes the state the guarantor rights to the product of intellectual as well as physical labor in society as a community of animals. Yet, since the state is objective, a purely subjective dialectic can only lead to a rational state that does not yet exist. The same dialectic leading to a rational state that has already constructed itself must be intersubjective or objective.

I have introduced Freudian defense mechanisms into my account of dialectical logic: repression and identification with the aggressor. Dialectical development is inferentially necessary in an indirect proof context. Yet if dialectical thought cannot proceed each step of the way by taking instructions from Hegel or some other dialectical authority, it is necessary for it to figure out each new operation by reflection on where it is now and by what previous construction it got there. Rules of deductive logic govern the construction, but they are only part of the story. They legitimate moves. Yet—with the exception of the negation of contradiction in indirect proof—they do not move thinking to make any particular move rather than others among the immense range of what is deductively permissible. Indirect proof is the emergence of elements of dialectical logic within formal deductive logic. If application of the rule of Negation of the Other (Rule 5) in dialectical logic is motivated by a need to repress some abstraction of an other that embarrasses some absolutization of what is abstract, we may wonder whether psychoanalysis can be combined with deductive logic to provide a more complete account of dialectical logic. In other words, can we understand dialectical logic as a dialectical psycho-logic? The next chapter is an attempt to respond to this question.

NOTES

2. By the historical sections of the *Phenomenology*—I mean those which correspond to the emergence and development of the political state. I take the dialectics of life and death struggle and lordship and bondage, in the chapter on self-consciousness, to correspond to the emergence of the state, as explained in the writings of Franz Oppenheimer.
3. Jean Hyppolite, *Hegel's Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis, New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy*, ed. By W.E. Steinkraus, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1971.
4. This dialectic of revolution and restoration follows the formal pattern of Hegel's classical dialectic of the organic whole. A method of translating such a dialectic (which Hegel himself never formalized) into a deductively necessary derivation using ordinary modern symbolic logic is given in *The Reducibility of Hegelian to Standard Logic*, a paper of mine forthcoming in *The Personalist*.
5. C.W. Mills, *The New Left, Power, Politics and People*, ed. By I.L. Horowitz, Ballantine, New York. This essay was originally published in the *New Left Review*, No. 5, October

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1960. For an historical survey of the New Left, see Jack Newfield, *A Prophetic Minority*, New American Library, New York, 1966. See also William O'Neil, 'The New Left Comes and Goes,' *Coming Apart: An Informal History of the 1960s*, Quadrangle, Chicago, 1971.
6. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. by J.B. Baillie, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1931, p. 369.
 7. Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counterculture*, Doubleday, New York 1969, p. 66. See also the following on hippies: William Braden, *The Age of Aquarius: Technology and the Cultural Revolution*, Quadrangle, Chicago 1970; William O'Neil, 'The Counterculture,' op.cit.; Charles Reich, *The Greening of America*, Random House, New York 1971. To note only one among numerous articles: Jesse Pitts, 'The Counter Culture: Tranquilizer or Revolutionary Ideology,' *Dissent*, June 1971. For brief comments by Herbert Marcuse on hippies and the counterculture, see *Five Lectures*, Beacon, Boston 1970, pp. 69ff.
 8. Hegel, op.cit., pp. 384-9.
 9. Ibid., pp. 391-400.
 10. William O'Neil, op.cit., p. 252.
 11. Jesse Pitts, op.cit., p. 223.
 12. William Braden, op.cit., pp. 231-4. See also William O'Neil, op.cit., pp. 295-305, on revolutionism and the weathermen.
 13. Hegel, op.cit., pp. 402-12.
 14. James Nolan, 'The Jesus Freaks,' *Religion for a New Generation*, ed. by J. Needleman. A.K. Bierman & J.A. Gould, Macmillan, New York 1973. Nolan notes that Jesus people were frequently disillusioned revolutionaries. (Just as I use the term 'yippies' as a symbol for a far broader group, so the term 'Jesus people' is used as a convenient way of referring to a wider religiosity, including non-Christian oriental strains.)
 15. Hegel, op.cit., pp. 419-38.
 16. Darrel Christensen, 'Authenticity and Warranted Belief in Hegel's Dialectic of Religion,' *Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. by D. Christensen, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1970.
 17. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by T.M. Knox, Univ. of Oxford Press, London 1952,

pp. 212 and 289.

18. Hegel, *ibid.*, p. 213.